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Abstract 
In the introduction part, some concepts: state, nationalism, citizenship are explained and a brief 
information about Israel, Turkey and Kibbutz communities, Village Institutes are given in order 
to draw the framework of the study. Moreover, the reasons of studying on this topic where it 
can stand in literature are explained in the “introduction” part. The study is divided into two 
chapters and in the first chapter the focus is on Israel and Kibbutz communities. In order to 
have a meaningful understanding, some important developments in Israel’s history are ex-
plained in this chapter. It is aimed to frame it in a certain period that starts with the late 19th 
century and finishes in 1970s. However, it became clear that in order to understand the im-
portance of the Kibbutz it was necessary to have a look at more forward and see its situation 
today. Kibbutz –when examined in detail- can be the topic of a huge study and it would exceed 
the limits of this study to mention most of the details. Hence, while determining the limits, 
significant details are explained in order to show the state’s and political elite’s influence on 
Kibbutz, later on.  
In the second chapter, the focus is Turkey and Village Institutes. Village Institutes has a special 
place in Turkish modernization period and in political debates even today. In order to under-
stand the reasons of establishment of Village Institutes and why they could live only eight years 
it is necessary to explain: Turkish way of modernization, historical roots of modernization with 
Ottoman Empire, policies employed by the new Republic, what were the motivations to think 
of a project to reach the villages, etc. All these developments and their relations with Village 
Institutes, its collapse, and official closing are discussed in chapter two. In order to compare 
Kibbutz with Village Institutes and consequently Israel and Turkey in the conclusion part his-
torical and current developments are given and discussed.  
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Özet 
Giriş kısmında, ‘devlet, milliyetçilik, vatandaşlık gibi kavramlar incelenmiş çalışmanın çerçe-
vesini belirlemesi açısından Israil – Türkiye ve Kibbutz toplulukları- Köy Enstitüleri hakkında 
genel bir bilgi verilmiştir. Yanı sıra bu çalışmanın yapılmasının sebebi ve literatürde nasıl ko-
numlanabileceği de açıklanmıştır. Çalışma iki ana kısma ayrılmış ve ilk kısımda odak Israil ve 
Kibutz toplulukları olarak belirlenmiştir. Daha anlamlı bir fikir edinme için Israil’in tarihi genel 
hatlarıyla açıklanmıştır. 19. yüzyıl sonlarından başlayarak 1970’li yıllarda bitirmek üzere amaç-
lanan çalışma sonrasında –Kibbutz toplulukları hâlâ aktif ve var oldukları üzere- daha ileri ta-
rihlere de değinmenin elzem olduğu ortaya çıkmış ve sonuç bölümünde yakın geçmişe de de-
ğinilmiştir. Kibbutz, detaylı bir incelemeye kalkışılırsa, başlı başına devasa bir araştırma ko-
nusu olabileceği ve bu çalışmanın sınırlarını aşacağı üzere, devletin ve politik seçkin zümrenin 
etkisini gösterecek önemli detaylar üzerinde daha fazla durulmuştur.  
İkinci ana kısımda odak, Türkiye ve Köy Enstitüleri’dir. Köy Enstitüleri Türk modernleşmesi 
sürecinde ve bugün bile süren siyasi tartışmalarda özel bir yere sahiptir. Köy Enstitülerinin 
kuruluşunun ve sadece 8 yıl yaşayabilmelerinin sebebini anlamak için Türk modernleşmesinin 
tarihsel kökenlerine gitmek gerekecek ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun ve Türkiye Cumhuri-
yeti’nin uyguladığı politikalara bakarak anlamak mümkün olacaktır. Tüm bu gelişmeler ve bun-
ların Köy Enstitüleri ile ilişkileri, enstitülerin yıkılışı ve resmi olarak kapanışı ikinci ana kı-
sımda tartışılmıştır. Sonuç bölümünde Kibbutz ve Köy ve Enstitülerini, dolayısıyla Israil ve 
Türkiye’yi karşılaştırmak için tarihi ve güncel olaylardan yararlanılmıştır. 
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Introduction 
This study contains a comparative analysis of the two countries, Israel and Turkey, with respect 
to the impact of the state institutions and the political elite on the lives of their citizens through 
the establishment of two institutions: Kibbutz communities and the Village Institutes. It is im-
portant to underline that these two countries and institutions resemble each other from several 
aspects at certain period of times. It is clearly stated in the study that from the late of 19th century 
till the mid of 20th century both states employed similar policies by using those institutions as 
a tool. In order to grow the wanted society and the state, political elite classes in both countries 
used, and sometimes abused, people living or being educated in those institutes. It was a way 
of shaping the society and the state by using the contexts of nationality, religion, goodwill, and 
wish of an independent state. This study deals with both states’ policies and institutions during 
the claimed period of time. It is questioned whether it was only for the general will of the society 
or were the political elite classes were trying to modernize, nationalize, and industrialize their 
countries. Each country had a different reaction from the society when decided to establish the 
institutions, and during the times when institutions existed.  In introduction part it is aimed to 
conceptualize the terms: general will, ethnicity, nation, the state, general will and citizenship1.  
                                                 
1As conceptualization of all these terms exceeds the limits of the study, the main focus of this 
study will be on the concept of citizenship, which is assumed to be instrumentalized by the 
state actors  to form the society along with the founding ideologies.  
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Research Question: 
Village Institutes and Kibbutz communities are still being discussed because of the fact that in 
Turkey and Israel a lot of people are not still sure what would happen if those institutions con-
tinued to serve for the their states and for the society. However, there is a third view that ques-
tions the reasons of the establishments of these institutes and search the existence of the states 
in them. The main question of this dissertation is that did people really need to devote their 
lives to the general will of the states in Kibbutz camps of Israel and Village Institute of Turkey? 
People who lived in these institutes tried to do their bests in every field of life. They had a great 
motivation of living on a better land. It is their independent state where they wanted to live, 
within certain borders. Students in Village Institutes were relatively luckier than people in Kib-
butz communities as they were not working for an independent state but to develop their states 
mainly economically and improve people’s intellectuality in country by teaching what they 
learnt in the institutes. People living in Kibbutz communities, on the other hand, had to produce 
for Jewish society living in Palestine, too. Main motivation of the people in both was that they 
were working for their states’ and society’s good. Policies, employed by Turkish and Israeli 
political elite shaped both institutions. Discourses like; national identities, citizenship, an eco-
nomically and politically independent state, democracy influenced people in these institutions 
pretty much. However, was the only thing in states’ political elites’ minds peoples’ and the 
states’ wellbeing or did they also try to protect their privileges is another question that is tried 
to be answered in this study. In both states, political elite class, worked hard to modernize the 
society by imitating Western states. An important problem that they did not take into consider-
ation a lot was convenience of the people to that imported modernity. In this study, main ques-
tion to be answered is to find out the reasons of establishing those institutes and what have been 
the consequences of those institutions’ acts during the times when they were active and after 
they have been closed or continued only symbolically.  
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Literature Review 
In order to understand and explain the states’ and political elite classes’ roles on policy making 
and shaping peoples’ lives who have lived or studied in the established –by government - insti-
tutes and in the state in general there are some discourses, that are commonly studied by social 
scientists, like; citizenship, national identity, nationalism, state, and general will. It is difficult 
to set forth a definition of citizenship that is accepted worldwide as there are several definitions 
accepted by several cohorts. According to Heather for instance, “citizenship is a form of socio-
political identity. … It existed for hundreds of years during the human history. Sometimes it 
was with harmony of other forms, sometimes in competition; sometimes it was a dominant form 
of identity, sometimes it was submerged by others; sometimes it was distinct from other kinds, 
sometimes subsumed into one or other” (Heather, 2004, p. 1). Citizenship corporation teaches 
the subjects of being individuals endowed with rights by leaving just being governed subjects 
(Kaya, 2000). 
Moreover, there are several states and several different understandings of those states on citi-
zenship and a lot of states try to keep their citizens as subjects and prefer teaching them their 
duties rather than their rights. Almost each state employs different policies for their citizens in 
the territories where they are accepted as “sovereign” and this makes it too difficult to deal with 
all of these states and come up with a satisfactory answer for a common definition of citizen-
ship. States have different definitions of the citizenship that have been shaped mostly according 
to states’ needs. This study deals with two states at a certain period of time: Turkey and Israel. 
These two states are chosen because there are quite interesting policies that these states em-
ployed during the years of the struggle of gaining their independencies and after they gained 
their independency. There are two institutions that were established for a rapid development-
one in each state-which pretty resembles each other from several aspects. Both states were 
claiming to be democratic but both had a lot of policies that can be questionable as democratic. 
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As a result of these so called democratic regimes’ policies each state established an institution 
for the state and for their citizens’ ‘good will’:  Village Institutes in Turkey and Kibbutz camps 
in Israel.  
Miller explains and questions the problematic of citizenship in the modern states, which I think, 
began in the ones that were founded in the very beginning of 20th century as follows.  
The problem of citizenship and pluralism is easy to state but very difficult to solve. Its prem-
ise is the cultural fragmentation of modern states. Members of these states are in the process 
of adopting an ever more disparate set of personal identities, as evidenced by their ethnic 
affiliations, their religious allegiances, their views of personal morality, their ideas about 
what is valuable in life, their tastes in art, music and so forth. In all these areas there is less 
convergence or agreement than there once was. Yet at the same time the individuals and 
groups having these fragmented identities need to live together politically, and this means 
finding some common basis or reference point from which their claims on the state can be 
judged. Citizenship is supposed to provide this reference point. Our personal lives and com-
mitments may be very different, but we are equally citizens, and it is as citizens that we 
advance claims in the public realm and assess the claims made by others. Yet if fragmenta-
tion is as far-reaching as the premise implies, how is it possible for us to share a common 
identity as citizens? We may share a common legal status, a formally-defined set of rights 
and obligations, but how can we agree about what it means to be a citizen, what rights and 
obligations ought to be included in the legal status, and beyond that how we ought to behave 
when occupying the role of citizen? The very state of affairs that makes common citizenship 
so important to us seems at the same time to expose it as a pipe dream.  (Miller, Citizenship 
and National Identity, 2000, p. 41) 
In each country citizens were educated and trained to become good citizens and after becoming 
an educated and skilled citizen they had to train and educate other uneducated and unskilled 
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citizens for the state and for the good will of them. Both states were in search of “good-accepta-
ble” citizens and they both had a certain opinion that education and training is the most im-
portant key to have that kind of citizens. Turkey and Israel tried to produce citizens by using 
education as the key tool. Füsun Üstel for instance, clearly reveals the importance of education 
on growing citizens in Turkey, in her book In Search of the Acceptable Citizen (Makbul 
Vatandaşın Peşinde (Ustel, 2011). 
Democracy is to be taught all people in the country and all people had to go on their lives by 
digesting that given democracy models and implementing it in their daily lives. It was almost 
like a scientific experiment to try to create citizens in both Israel and Turkey.  
However, according to Stevenson, what is crucial within a democratic context is that indi-
viduals are ‘free’ to become themselves, make up their own minds, and follow their own 
interests and passions. Freedom in the context of a democratic society means something 
other than what it has come to mean in a market driven and progressively state regulated 
society. It clearly does not mean rote learning, always offering back what the teacher wishes 
to hear, training, or indeed selling courses to the public in order to enhance their future earn-
ing potential. A life that is worth living instead depends upon citizens who are driven to 
make up their own minds, who will jealously cling to liberal freedoms and be willing to 
explore ideas and perspectives that they might initially find strange or threatening” 
(Stevenson, 2011, p. 8). 
People in both Village Institutes and Kibbutz were trying to do their bests for the sake of their 
utopian society and country. They were very aware of their duties as citizens. Both states had a 
great influence on most of the people living in those countries. Most of the people have faith in 
their states and they were thinking that first of all they had to build their states. They believed 
that their lives can be sacrificed for their state and consequently for the next generations. In 
order to achieve their goals of leaving a better place for their children they thought that their 
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states had to stand forever to protect them. State was almost most important concept and each 
person living in it had to do all she/he could for the state. The main perception was having an 
independent state with certain borders is the only thing that can let people survive and gain their 
liberty. “Although we now take for granted the division of the world into states, we should not 
assume neither that the state always was the dominant principle of political organization, nor 
that it always will be. There was a world before states and, as advocates of globalization tire-
lessly point out there may be a world after them too” (Hague & Harrop, Comparative 
Government and Politics, 2010, p. 20).  According to Adam Smith to the Institute of Interna-
tional Economic Relations states should not have another duty except protecting and imple-
menting the law (Kaya, 2000). 
It is really important to underline the fact that we produced states. They can never be a reason 
of our beings but just a result of our hopes of living in better conditions. However in some 
societies-may be as a result of having a state after several struggles and wars-the state is more 
important than anything in the territories limited by the borders. There is a very famous Turkish 
proverb, for instance, claimed to be said by Kemal Atatürk “All other things are just details if 
the issue is the state”. In an environment like this, it is not very difficult to persuade your citi-
zens to do their bests for their states. Turkey and Israel are the states which both were founded 
in the 20th century. It was not an easy task to announce their independence for both. Each 
experienced a war of independence to be ruled by themselves and after gaining their independ-
ency and drawing their borders each had to deal with several other issues.  
According to Ozkirimli, nation, since it showed up as an organizational form, is more valuable 
than the individual and human life (Ozkirimli, 2008). Hence it was very common and popular 
to be a nation-state at the time both Israel and Turkey tried to fit into the nation-state description. 
It was difficult for both to fit into that description as there were a lot of people who did not fit 
into that description but existing in these lands at the time. On one hand Turkey had to deal 
13 
 
with non-Turks, non-Muslims and on the other hand the state of Israel had to deal with non-
Jewish and Arab people to have its own nation-state.  
Kibbutz Communities and Village Institutes were the institutions that were mainly used as a 
tool to nationalize the economy and the state and produce the acceptable citizens that fits into 
the citizenship description of Israel and Turkey. It is aimed to reach an explanation by ques-
tioning those institutions that were both established by the claimed states.  
Israel, Kibbutz camps: 
‘A land without a people, a people without a land’ is phrase that is associated with the Jews and 
Zionist movement. Jews, especially who believed in Zionist ideology seemed Palestine as a 
promised land by God for the Jews. They started settling systematically to Palestine at the end 
of 19th century. Kibbutz communities were firstly founded after the first settlers had come to 
Palestine. Palestine is a small territory when it is compared to the most of other countries has 
been a very important place for a lot of people, states, religions, etc.  
It is slightly larger than the state of Massachusetts and the repercussions developments in and 
attitudes toward this small piece of southern Syria have reverberated throughout the Middle 
East and the world at large, shaping regional and Great Power relationships, influencing US 
and European domestic politics, generating five wars, creating over 1 million refugees, and 
producing misunderstandings and bitterness among the various parties involved. There are var-
ious views of historians on this conflict. Some believes that the failure to resolve the conflict 
between Jewish immigration and the preservation of Palestinian Arab rights rest with the inde-
cisiveness and biases of the various British governments that held power during the twenty-
eight years of the mandate (1920-48). Some argue that the question is not one of failure but of 
the triumph of the Zionist immigrants and their supporters in overcoming Arab resistance, Brit-
ish opposition, and European anti-Semitism to forge the state of Israel against overwhelming 
odds. Another group, on the other hand, questions that why the Palestinians became a minority 
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1948 while they had been the majority in 1920s. A small territory that had been inhabited by 
an Arab majority for some 1,200 years was promised by a third party (Great Britain) as a na-
tional home to another people (the international Jewish community), the majority of who lived 
in Eastern Europe. The oppressed conditions in which East European Jews lived prompted the 
Zionists among the to take up Britain’s promise and to attempt to construct in Palestine a Jewish 
national home; at the same time, the established Arab community of Palestine opposed the 
notion of turning its homeland into a Jewish State and, to the extent that it was able to do so, 
resisted the process. The Zionist claims to the same territory inhabited by Palestinian Arabs lay 
at the root of the conflict over Palestine. (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 239-240)   
The clashes and discussions between Jews and Arabs still continue. It can be useful to take the 
whole history into consideration but it will exceed this study’s limit. Thus, the focus is mainly 
from late 19th until the mid of 20th century. The Kibbutzim were agricultural settlements in 
which all property belonged to the community and all responsibilities were shared equally by 
the members. They became a symbol of the cooperative communal order that many of the early 
Zionists hoped to build in Palestine. The Kibbutz movement also represented the ideal of Jewish 
rejuvenation through the dignity of labor and working the land. This was a significant impulse 
within the Yishuv (Jewish people living in the land of Israel) and imparted to the community a 
socialist economic orientation and glorification of the new Jewish self-image in which the pas-
sive and oppressed ghetto dwellers of Europe gave way to the self confident, physically active 
workers, farmers, and soldiers of Palestine capable of determining their own destinies 
(Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). It can also be claimed that early Kibbutz members were trying to 
change the capitalist Jewish image into a socialist one as people living in these communes were 
living a socialist life. In Kibbutz communities almost everything was on the basis of equality.  
The settlers of Kibbutz communities were aware of being in a land that was governed by them. 
Second generation settlers or the ones born in the Kibbutz camps are more conscious of where 
15 
 
they were living and they had a certain goal because Kibbutz children were collectively care 
for in children’s houses while their parents work and they were exposed to multiple caregivers 
very early in their life (Aviezer, 2003). This hope encouraged most of the settlers on doing their 
bests for a utopian society. Kibbutz camps were the place for a lot of people where they thought 
were the most convenient places for establishing a state where they had the right to govern. 
There were more than 300 collective agricultural settlements. Despite having ideological and 
structural changes they can be called as under the title of “kibbutz movement” when the simi-
larities among them are taken into consideration. (Spiro M. E., Venture in Utopia, 1963). Al-
most all of the people living in Kibbutz camps were Jews. They also became the most ethnically 
homogenous body in Israeli society: it was established on the basis of excluding Palestinian 
Arabs, and included almost all of who were exclusively Eastern European Jews, and did not 
want to embrace Mizrachi Jews -immigrants of Mizrahi Jewish communities- (Shafir & Peled, 
2002). It was like a prototype of the wanted Jewish nation-state. 
Turkey and Village Institutes:  
The transition of Turkey from empire to nation between 1918 and 1922 can, in its most visible 
form, be summarized as loss of territory: the Balkans had been lost during the earlier Balkan 
wars (1912-1913), and were now irrecuperable; the Levantine provinces were bent on estab-
lishing their own national identity; and finally, the Ottoman Hijaz, the locus of the most sacred 
Islamic places, emerged as the center of an Arab uprising engineered by no other than the Tur-
cophobe infidel “Lavrens”. (Mardin S. , The Ottoman Empire, 1997, p. 115)  
Passing from monarchic Ottoman Empire to Republic of Turkey was also a fundamental change 
of Ottoman traditional political structure At the end of World War I the defeated Ottomans were 
soon split into two contending parties: the sultan’s government in Istanbul versus the movement 
of resistance to the Allies’ intention of dividing up the empire, located in Ankara. The Allies’ 
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promotion of the invasion of Anatolia by Greek forces in 1919 had uncovered their wider pol-
icy: the forces of resistance had a clear Anatolian-Turkish (and at the beginning of the process 
partly Kurdish) focus; the leaders of the Arab population having opted out of the empire were 
not part of the movement. Anatolia, the setting in which the resistance movement crystallized, 
provided a unified platform for a group that deep down exhibited the already existing split of 
Young Turk politics between secularists and moderate-to-radical Islamists. This was also partly 
dividing line between a Western-oriented bureaucratic elite and provincial notables. Their dif-
ference had already appeared in a heated sociopolitical debate between 1908 and 1918. The 
fulcrum of this discussion was not so much desirability of democracy per se, since even, Muslim 
conservative intellectuals of the period had supported the principle of the sultan’s responsibility 
towards his subjects. The contentious point was the foundation of such a democracy, i.e., would 
it rest on the law of God or on the will of the people (Mardin S. , Türk Modernleşmesi, 2012)? 
As Babul put it very rightfully, “the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 marks the 
official construction of a new community and new forms of belonging that were expected to 
replace the communities and forms of belonging characteristics of the Ottoman Empire” (Babul, 
2006, p. 47). It was not an easy task to create a new community that can adapt to the discourse 
of a republic and to a modernity that was shaped by the political elite class.  
In the early republican era Village Institutes has a special place when the discourse and the 
application of populism2towards the village and the villagers are considered. There are few 
practices as polemical and polarizing as Village Institutes in Turkey. This unique educational 
practice between 1937 and 1946 became the focus of political and ideological discussions in 
1950s and 1960s in Turkey. On one hand, Village Institutes represented “real” Kemalism’s 
peak point according to left-Kemalists and on the other hand it was a scapegoat for rightists and 
                                                 
2Populism (Halkçılık) has a different meaning in Kemalist discourse: basically, transferring 
the power to the citizens. 
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conservatives that they used as an argument of their anti-communist campaigns 
(Karaömerlioğlu A. , 2014). 
Village Institutes were seen as a factory of producing good citizens. One of the most important 
things in the agenda of the governing party (Republican People’s Party -) was to reach that 
citizen. Hasan Ali Yucel, minister of national education at the time, known as the architect of 
Village Institutes was the man managing both the physical (building news institutes, funding 
the institutes, etc.) and the educational (what to teach and how to train the students in the insti-
tutes) to reach the best citizen who will be most useful for her/his state and teach-train other 
people for their state. In his book “Good Citizen, Good Human” (İyi Vatandaş, İyi İnsan) Yucel 
claims that becoming a “good” citizen is even more important than becoming a “good” human. 
As it is the best way to try to be a “good” citizen if someone is trying to be a “good” person 
(Yucel, 2011).  
Rationale of the Research:  
In the literature as much as I can scan there are a great number of researches that deal with both 
countries. There are also plenty of researches on Village Institutes and Kibbutz communities. 
However, it is not possible to say that there are as many researches that question the states’ and 
political elite classes’ influence on these institutions. Turkey and Israel resembles each other as 
both have similar governing discourses and maybe because of this discourse people, living in 
these countries, have similar approaches on certain issues. On one hand Village Institutes are 
still a matter of discussion in Turkey for instance but the main discussion has been stuck be-
tween whether it had a great importance for a modern, national, developed Turkey or it was a 
project that aimed to spread communism in the country. Kibbutz camps on the other hand were 
established with great hopes and motivations of the early Jewish settlers of Palestine. People in 
these communities had the hope for an egalitarian Jewish society in Palestine and their ultimate 
goal was to create a democratic state in which everybody had the right of living in peace and 
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safe. However, in Turkish case, Village Institutes were closed by the governing party as a result 
of not having expected support of students in the institutes and pressure from the opposition 
political party and Kibbutz communities lost their prestige and influence in Jewish society when 
they became less useful for the state in terms of mass production as the state became an indus-
trialized one. This study, on the other hand, is not for describing those states and institutions 
but rather it is for exploring the differences and similarities between Israel and Turkey in terms 
of the institutions they established in twentieth century: Kibbutz and Village Institutes.  One of 
the mostly used discourse used by both states was these institutions are for the general will of 
the society. The general-will means that when citizens live and work for the good and future of 
society altogether but not for the interests of a particular group or individuals in it (Hague & 
Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics, 2010). Both Israel and Turkey were in search 
of the more developed and industralized nation states rather than a democratic and an egalitarian 
ones. This study aims to explore the mentioned and intented goals of the political elite class on 
Kibbutz communities and Village Institutes discourses.  
The quest for a more perfect society is probably as old as humankind. This quest has, typically, 
taken two forms. On the one hand, there have been social theorists and philosophers who pro-
jected in literary forms their visions of ideal society, but who did not themselves attempt to 
establish one. On the other hand, there have been men and women, fired with conviction and 
purpose, who banded together in order to found utopian societies. Despite the many differences 
among and between the dreamers and the founders, a common premise underlies most of their 
dreams and their activities: raw human nature, if nourished in the “proper” social environment, 
can give rise to that kind of human being who approximates, at least, humankind’s noblest 
image herself/himself. This premise, whether viewed as naive or as realistic, serves to remind 
us that humankind is not always concerned with the real and the given, but may, at times, be 
motivated by the ideal and the novel. Human beings’ purposes, in other words are not limited 
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by fixed structures, whether biological or social, but may be directed towards the creation of 
emergent structures. (Spiro M. E., Venture in Utopia, 1963, p. 3) 
As Spiro discusses, there have been people who tried to found a utopian society and people 
who believed in the possibility of that society (Spiro M. E., Venture in Utopia, 1963). It is to 
be explored what are the states’ and the political elites’ roles on people’s lives that are called 
and accepted as ‘citizens’. What kind of policies have they developed in order to create the 
“good- acceptable” citizen and to come up with the “best” citizen and a good society for the 
state at the end of the day. Do the state and the political elite have the right of a direct touch on 
those people’s lives, do they really have that right to enter citizens’ lives directly and decide on 
behalf of them, and what are the consequences of those touches. As mentioned above, this study 
tries to explore the similarities and differences in both states’ policies employed via institutions: 
Village Institutions and Kibbutz communities.  
Method:  
Social research is mostly conducted in order to explore a something, and to start to familiarize 
a researcher with that topic and exploration typically occurs when a new interest is examined 
or when the subject of study itself is a relatively new study. There are plenty of researches on 
both countries (Israel and Turkey) and both institutions (Kibbutz camps and Village Institutes) 
but comparing both and questioning their beings at certain periods can be a new and conse-
quently an explorative one. Hence, this study is mainly explorative rather than an explanation 
or a description. On the other hand, in social science research, the most typical unit of analysis 
is individual people (Babbie, 2007, pp. 87-88). It is the individuals focused mostly on in this 
study too. However, the unit of analysis is not only individuals but also institutions like, camps, 
schools and also states. The traditional subject of comparative politics is the state. In order to 
understand the state we must also examine the social and economic forces that impinge upon 
it, and the culture within which it functions (Brown, 2006).  
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Everything may be compared, but the question must always be raised, why do it? Is the com-
parison mechanical or dynamic, descriptive or analytic? In other words, does the topic deserve 
to be studied and what is to be reached at the end of the study? Village Institutes in Turkey still 
has a great importance in political discussions. However there are not many different arguments 
on it. Actually there are two main approaches; one is supporting (mainly by Kemalist ideology) 
and the other group (mainly conservative and rightist people) says it was a big mistake that 
could lead to spread of communism in Turkey. Kibbutz camps on the other hand have much 
less importance today in Israel than it once had at the beginning of the 20th century. There are 
discussions on the importance of the Kibbutz communities today, too. A relatively small num-
ber of people in Israel still insist on living and developing the Kibbutz again while they are just 
seemed as romantic and idealist people by the majority. Both countries’ policies and both insti-
tutions resemble each other and there can be a third discussion and governing elites’ intentions 
at the time should be discussed too. 
First and above all, it is our obligation to study all those organized manifestations, attitudes, 
and movements that press directly for state action or oppose state action. No matter what terms 
we use- decision making, authoritative allocation of values, regulation, adjudication, enforce-
ment- we are concerned with the same old thing: the state (Macridis, 2006). As both institutions 
were for the goodwill of the state, one of the main points in this study is the states of Israel and 
Turkey.  
All nations on the modern side of the scale may be compared in terms of their distinctive expe-
rience of modernization. Each of these nations at one time was traditional; in each case the 
traditional society was undermined and eventually displaced by new forms of organization. The 
process of modernization inevitably causes a series of political crises. Whatever the nature of 
the traditional society and whatever the nature of the modern political institutions, at least three 
political crises must be surmounted in the course of modernization:  the crises of legitimacy, 
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participation, and conflict management. The way in which these crises occur and are dealt with 
is of great consequence for the functioning of modern political system. (Brown, 2006, p. 49) 
In Turkish and Israeli case I focused on these crises by taking the mentioned institutions con-
sideration.   
The socialist Leviathan-state was the logical culmination of the modernization process, but it 
did not turn out to be the wave of the future. Instead, the expansion of the bureaucratic state 
eventually approached a set of natural limits, and change began to move in a new direction. 
From the Industrial Revolution until well into the second half of the twentieth century, indus-
trial society followed the process of modernization. This transformed political and cultural sys-
tems from traditional regimes legitimated by religious belief systems to rational-legal states 
legitimated by their claim to maximize the welfare of their people through scientific expertise. 
(Brown, 2006, p. 67) 
During the modernization period in both Israel and Turkey, political elites convinced the people 
under their control by using this discourse. Most of the people in Israel believed that only unit-
ing under a religious umbrella would led them have a liberal state and communes in Kibbutz 
communities were one of the keys to own a liberal state. In Kibbutz camps, however, a socialist 
and communal lifestyle was very common. In Turkey on the other hand discourse of a national, 
modern, and industrialized country was very popular. The governing part was very aware of 
the fact that they could only be successful if they could tell and convince the people in villages. 
Thus, establishing Village Institutes was an important task for the Republican People’s Party at 
the time.  
It was a transfer of authority from family and religious institutions to political institutions and 
within the last 25 years, a major change in the direction of change has occurred, which might 
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be called the postmodern shift. Coupled with the safety net modern welfare state, this has pro-
duced unprecedentedly high levels of economic security. It has given rise to a cultural feedback 
that is having a major impact on both the economic and political systems of advanced industrial 
societies.  It shifts authority away from both religion and the state to the individual, with an 
increasing focus on individual concerns such as friends and leisure. (Brown, 2006, p. 67) 
However, in Turkish and Israeli case the situation was not actually just like this. In these two 
countries, especially by showing security purpose as a reason people were suppressed. Both 
countries still insist on policies which they were employing in the mid of 20th century. Even 
people who experienced Village Institutes (Dündar, 2000) and Kibbutz Camps (Freilich, 
Inventing Our Life: The Kibbutz Experiment, 2012) still claim that in their memories those 
days were more democratic and liberal than today.  
Scope of the study  
The first chapter deals with Israel and Kibbutz communities. Some important developments in 
Israel’s history are explained in this chapter. Jewish community experienced several wars and 
clashes with its Arab neighbors and Kibbutz communities took part in these clashes and wars 
both in supplying goods and people to fight against enemies. A certain period is studied that 
starts with the late 19th century and ends in 1960s when the Kibbutz was in great importance 
for Israeli society. Moreover, Kibbutz communities still exist in Israel today hence; its current 
situation is also explained in conclusion part. Kibbutz, when investigated in detail exceeds this 
study’s limits. Thus, some important titles were studied in order to understand its basic princi-
ples: i.e. education, daily life, family structure, establishment, and collapse of Kibbutz.  
In the second chapter, Turkey and Village Institutes are examined. Since the 19th century (Ot-
toman Empire’s modernization period) there is modernization period and Village Institutes pro-
ject is a part of this process. Ottoman Empire did great changes in order to live longer and keep 
the communities –that were still under Ottoman rule- together. This modernization and it is 
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often called as Westernization period did not last when Ottoman Empire collapsed and Republic 
of Turkey was established. This chapter deals with all these modernization movements and a 
bit of history to put the reasons of establishment and collapse of the Village Institutes Project. 
In the second part of the chapter Village Institutes are investigated and main discussion is the 
reasons and motivations of its establishment and rejections against the project. As the project 
is still a matter of discussion, mainstream arguments and unique view are compared. In both 
studies the historical framework is determined to start in19th century and end in 1970s. How-
ever, it is extended when it is needed in order to explain a certain event.  
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Chapter 1 
Israel and Kibbutz Community 
1.1 Israel between 1890s-1967:  
In this chapter, the focus is Israel and Jews from the late 19th century till 1967 war and Kibbutz 
movement during this period. Before the early Jewish settlers had come to Palestine it was the 
land of Palestinian Arabs and after Jewish arrival to the land there have often been conflicts 
between Jewish and non-Jewish population. As mentioned in the introduction part, Jews were 
in search of a home that only belongs to Jews and according to Jews who believed strongly in 
Zionist ideology owning a state is the only way of living in safe maybe as a result of experienc-
ing several threats from several groups, peoples, and states.  
Territorial disputes between states or peoples are often difficult to resolve. The dispute over 
Palestine between the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionist movement is one of the most intracta-
ble, and in the international community has played a major role. Beyond that, other nations 
have suffered a spillover of violence from it, both as full-scale war and as acts of violence 
against individuals. Indeed, the world community has had to live with the possibility that hos-
tilities generated by this conflict could lead to a war between the superpowers. Much of the 
thinking about the conflict has been oriented toward proposals that both sides can accept. That 
effort has been fruitful. However, solutions are not likely to be effective in the long term unless 
they take into account the legitimate interests at stake. In any negotiating context parties begin 
with their claimed rights, whether it is negotiation between an employer and a trade union or 
two neighboring countries disputing their border. This is the element that has not been suffi-
ciently prominent in the search for an end to the conflict between the Palestine Arabs and the 
Zionist movement. Before solutions can be devised, due consideration must be given to the 
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rights involved. (Quigley, 1990, p. 1) This conflict has always constituted an important place 
in the agenda of Israel and consequently of kibbutz movement too.  
In the 1880s, there was no state of Israel or Palestine. It did not have a political entity, instead 
it was a district of Ottoman Empire, the Sanjak of Jerusalem and Vilayet of Beirut. The exact 
population is not known but guessed to be over 600,000 in which Arabs mostly Sunni Muslims 
constitute the majority and a significant minority of Christians. However, Arab society was 
forced to confront the unanticipated challenge of Jew anxious to re-create their own way of life 
in their ancestral homeland. Jews, who were resting in peace in Europe and helping the improv-
isation of the continent from several aspects faced with new doctrines of nationalism and ra-
cialism and these doctrines leaded to great tragedies in the history of Jews. The largest numbers 
of Jews were not living in Western or Central Europe but rather in Russia where they confronted 
with discrimination like; restricted access to education, and entering having certain professions. 
In 1882 Jews, with enacting a new law, were not even allowed to live in towns or villages. All 
these factors and their religious motivations caused mass migrations to Palestine, their ancestral 
homeland (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009).   
1.2 Political Zionism 
Migrations from several parts of the world led the idea of uniting and surviving altogether. The 
Zionist ideology was discussed at that time and Jewish people had an idea of how to survive 
after several discussions with considerable attendance from several Jewish communities. Kib-
butz communities are agricultural settlements and the idea of Zionism support these communi-
ties both ideologically and economically. After the pogroms in the 1880s Jews were separated 
groups and each had its own objective on Jewish settlement in Palestine and eventually they 
got together under an umbrella organization called the Lovers of Zion. This organization sup-
ported small agricultural settlements in Palestine, at the time. This movement faced with several 
difficulties as they did not become successful at first but they motivated several Jews and it is 
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regarded firs of aliyahs (migration waves) which later went on and ended up with an independ-
ent country: Israel.  Leo Pinsker writer of Autoemancipation and Theodor Herlzwriterof the 
Jewish State (1896) were two important figures and intellectuals who shaped the modern polit-
ical Zionism.  On one hand, in his booklet Pinkser argued that anti-Semitism was so deeply 
embedded in European society that there could never be an egalitarian society and protect Jew-
ish people’s rights even with the protection with laws. Jews had only one solution and it is that: 
they could not wait for their rights granted but create it themselves in an independent Jewish 
state. He did not insist on to establish the state in Palestine and his emphasis was on national 
identity rather than religion. When he did his call Zionism was an uncoordinated movement in 
1890s. For instance, a number of different Zionist organizations emerged and they had different 
solutions for the common problems. On the other hand, Herzl forged the existing strands of the 
ideology into a coherent one. He was not the founder of Zionist ideology but he made it a 
coherent international ideology. Because of his personal experiences he believed that in order 
to cope with anti-Jewish and anti-Semitist practices Jewish community needed their own sov-
ereign state. (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 240-243) 
He, like Pinkser, did not insist on Palestine for the place of the Jewish state.  Herzl was aware 
of the fact that Jews needed a single unified movement and largely because of his efforts, the 
first Zionist Congress was convened in Basel in 1897. The congress attracted more than 200 
delegates and represented a milestone for the Zinosit movement. It adopted a program that 
stated that the objective of Zinoism was to secure a legally recognized home in Palestine for 
the Jewish people. The Basel congress also agreed to establish the World Zionist Organization 
as the central administrative organ of the Zionist movement and to set up a structure of com-
mittees to give it cohesion and direction. In the years following the meeting at Basel, branches 
of the central congress were set up throughout Eastern Europe, and a grassroots annually after 
1897, and although the sessions often revealed deep divisions within Zionism, Herzl’s success 
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in attracting more and more delegates to each congress revealed the increasing appeal of the 
movement he headed.  Herzl believed that they needed to get support of a Great Power and the 
financial assistance of members of the Western Jewish community to make the movement suc-
cessful. However there were some obstacles that they had to overcome and he disappointed 
while dealing with these obstacles. The assimilated Jewish establishments in Western Europe 
and the United States feared that the assertion of Jewish distinctiveness, which was an integral 
part of Zinoism, would produce an anti-Semitic backlash that might threaten their position in 
society. Moreover, Sultan Abdul Hamid II was opposed to the idea of large-scale European 
Jewish settlement in Ottoman territory, and none of the European powers was inclined to sup-
port a movement offered no apparent diplomatic advantages. Thus, by the time of his death he 
had managed to infuse Zionism and to provide it with an organizational structure that enabled 
it to survive his passing, but he had not been able to obtain external governmental backing 
needed to fulfill the Basel program of establishing a legally recognized home for the Jewish 
people in Palestine. During World War I, however, the diplomatic statues of Zionism improved 
dramatically (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 242-243).  
1.3 The Balfour Declaration  
Jewish people were trying to get international support and they were quite successful. Arabs on 
the other hand were trying to do something in the land. They did not have a powerful bureau-
cratic network as Jews had but they were trying to do their bests to get back the territories that 
were purchased by the Jewish community. During the course of World War I, several factors 
combined to bring the question of Zionism to the attention of the British cabinet. The most 
pressing of them was the belief, held by several key government officials; those Jewish groups 
in the United States and Russia had the capacity to influence their respective governments’ 
attitudes toward the war.  Until the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917, the 
British cabinet was worried that Germany might make a declaration in support of Zionist aims 
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and thus attracts a sympathetic response from US Jewry. A similar consideration arose with 
regard to Russia, which was on the verge of military collapse and social revolution by autumn 
1917. Officials within the British government argued that a British gesture of goodwill toward 
Zionist aspirations might persuade influential Jewish members within the revolutionary move-
ment to attempt to keep Russia in the war. It does not matter that these various beliefs were ill 
founded; what is important is that they existed and helped determine British policy. Chaim 
Weizmen, the Zionist spokesman in London, also played a significant role in British policy-
making. He was a persuasive and persistent spokesman and he was effective in keeping the 
question of Zionism before the British cabinet and in cultivating ties with well-placed officials 
and public figures. He was helped immensely in his task by the cabinet’s recognition that British 
support for Zionism had the potential to serve British imperial interests. Britain’s sponsorship 
of Jewish settlement in Palestine would require a British presence in the region and would thus 
keep France out of an area that was contiguous to the vital Suez Canal zone. All of these factors 
interacted to produce a British declaration in support of Zionist objectives in Palestine. On No-
vember 2, 1917, the British foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, wrote to Lord Rothschild, a prom-
inent figure in British Zionist circles, informing him that the cabinet had approved the declara-
tion of sympathy for Jewish Zionist aspirations (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009).  
The declaration has an amazing language that says something but means much more than it 
says. The very first question for both Arabs and Jews is what kind of a national home it is. Is it 
national home for whom; Jews or Arabs? Who is going to govern that national home and what 
does national refer to? It is a declaration from a third party at the end of the day and neither 
Arabs nor Jews are a party in the declaration. Palestine was accepted a part of British Empire 
by British and according to them Jews can live in Palestine and it is also their national home 
anymore. British Empire was not in a great condition at the time when Balfour wrote that dec-
laration. It was aimed to gain a Jewish support by declaring of not being anti-Semitist.  
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1.4 British Mandate (1920-1948) 
There are various views of historians on these conflicts. Some believes that the failure to resolve 
the conflict between Jewish immigration and the preservation of Palestinian Arab rights rests 
with the indecisiveness and biases of governments between the years 1920-48 in Britain. British 
mandate over Palestine after the victory of Britain over Turkey lasted almost 30 years. It was 
not a colony but a Mandate from the newly established League of Nations and Britain -as she 
was claiming the land that it was under her control- was to be responsible for placing the country 
under political, administrative, and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the 
Jewish nation home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing in-
stitutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Pales-
tine, irrespective of race and religion. It created a disturbance on Arabs soon. During the 1920s 
the national home expanded. The number of the Jewish population increased from 83,790 in 
1922 to 992,559 in 1939. The Mandate also allowed Jews build up institutions and increase in 
the number of institutions was more significant than the increase in the population. Arab insti-
tutions on the other hand could not match those being developed by Jews. The Arab Executive 
proved a feeble vehicle for their aspirations, beset by feuds between followers of the Husseinis 
and Nashasibis – two leading Arab families in the area at the time-. In 1921 the principal office 
of Arab Palestine, Mufti of Jerusalem, was given to Haj Amin al Husseeini, who declared him-
self willing to work with the British. He was a strong nationalist and began to worry the British 
authorities by the 1920s, and by the mid-1930s he rapidly assumed the role of arch-villain. The 
conflict between Arabs and Jews was much clearer, anymore. It became the war of Jews and 
Arabs that would not end for decades and in which there have always been third parties. Some 
argue that the question is not one of failure but of the triumph of the Zionist immigrants and 
their supporters in overcoming Arab resistance, British opposition, and European anti-Semitism 
to forge the state of Israel against seemingly overwhelming odds. Another group, on the other 
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hand, questions that why the Palestinians became a minority 1948 while they had been the 
majority in 1920s. A small territory that had been inhabited by an Arab majority for some 1,200 
years was promised by a third party (Great Britain) as a national home to another people (the 
international Jewish community- most of them were inhabiting in Eastern Europe at the time-
). The oppressed conditions in which East European Jews lived prompted the Zionists among 
to take up Britain’s promise and to attempt to construct in Palestine a Jewish national home; at 
the same time, the established Arab community of Palestine opposed the notion of turning its 
homeland into a Jewish State and, to the extent that it was able to do so, resisted the process. 
The Zionist claims to the same territory inhabited by Palestinian Arabs lay at the root of the 
conflict over Palestine (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 244-248).  Both parties (Jewish com-
munity and Palestinian Arabs) were claiming to own the land and to become a sovereign and 
an independent state from a third party.  
Palestine was largely quite between 1922 and 1928, when violence returned in the form of 
disturbances between Arabs and Jews at the Western Wall in Jerusalem. However, serious con-
frontations at the Western Wall in August 1929 resulted in a wave of violence in which 133 
Jews and 116 Arabs were killed. It was just the beginning of the clashes that even, in 2016, 
stills goes on. These clashes at the time made Britain think about her policies one more time. 
Two British Commissions, under Sir Walter Shaw and Sir John Hope-Simpson, then attempted 
to redefine Britain’s policy in Palestine, by taking Arab fear of Jewish immigration into con-
sideration and land purchase at the root of the difficulties. Simpson’s recommendation was that 
the nature of the land would only allow for a further 20,000 Jewish immigrants provoked inev-
itable Zionist anger.  Britain’s decision did not help stop Jewish immigration to Palestine as 
Adolf Hitler became German Chancellor in January 1933 and by March he secured his dicta-
torship. Then the systematic exclusion of Jews from German national life soon followed. Hitler, 
before coming to power, had claimed that defeat of Germany was mainly because of Jews and 
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revolutionaries and developed an anti-Semitic view. Jews who faced with Hitler’s regime, and 
anti-Semitism in Poland and Romania began to leave Europe in large numbers. There were 
restrictions of immigration to the United States and they had Palestine as the last option. This 
fact caused a dramatic increase in the number of Jews in Palestine (Fraser, 2004, pp. 10-11).  
1.5 National Land Policy of Jews:  
Jewish land policy mainly based on national roots and it was shaped to a large extent by the 
Zionist movement and the Jewish National Fund (JNF) at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury. This national land policy had two basic principles: national ownership of the land and 
preservation of the agricultural land. National land ownership that was reinforced by the estab-
lishment of the JNF was more important than preservation of the agricultural land. Their first 
aim was to nationalize the land and then protect the agricultural land for the development of 
their land.  Hence the JNF saw the land acquired as the collective property of the Jewish people 
that could be sold or transferred to private owners. This principle is based on a biblical justifi-
cation. The lease period was also based on the Bible, specifically, the commands regarding the 
jubilee year, during which all lands are to be returned to their original owners, and all slaves 
are to be liberated. Underlying the link between Biblical and the essentially socialist-Zionist 
ideology was the desire to create a new Jew and a new nation according to ideals quite different 
from those of the Diaspora and of Eretz Israel at the time, whose landowners lived far away 
and regarded their large estates simply as a source of profit. The first basic principle was to 
build a society cooperatively based on farming in which there is no land ownership. The second 
basic principle was to preserve agricultural land:  for this, cooperative and communal rural 
settlement was the key. These two principles are mainly results from the Zionist vision. Na-
tional ownership of the land is the goal and preserving the agricultural land was the tool for that 
goal.  Hence, cooperation and settlement on agriculturally was very important for the Zionist 
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idea. On one hand Kibbutzim and Moshavim, two types of agricultural and cooperative settle-
ments, were essential for the establishment and the future of the Jewish State. On the other hand 
urban settlement was considered individual or family settlement, motivated by personal reason 
(Hananel, The Land Narrative: Rethinking Israel's National Land Policy, 2015, pp. 128-140). 
Kibbutz had an important place in employing settlement policies. Members of the kibbutz com-
munities had a strong feeling of creating and protecting their lands and they helped a lot to 
Yishuv to nationalize the land at the time.  
1.6 The Jewish Agency:  
Zionist organizations were considerably more extensive than Arab organizations. The Jewish 
community was better organized, financed, and connected than the Arabs. They had formally 
recognized body of representatives and access to British authority. They had plans and ideal for 
the future of their states. For these purposes World Zionist Organization created the Palestine 
Zionist Executive in 1921 and reorganized it as the Jewish Agency in 1929. The Jewish Agency 
then became the quasi-government of the Jewish community in Palestine, managing an impres-
sive array of services that ranged from banking systems to health care an immigrant settlement. 
This agency helped Jewish community for regular access to the high commissioner and other 
British officer. Jewish communal affairs were conducted through a hierarchy of representative 
organizations. The national assembly, constituted in 1920, was an elected body of some 300 
delegates who were selected from among themselves the members of the national council. The 
council had the power of employing administrative decisions on behalf of Jewish community 
in Palestine and was treated by the mandate government as the legitimate representative of Jews 
in Palestine (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 250-254). On one hand, Jewish community in 
Palestine was much better organized than the Arab community. They already had a kind of 
governing device that pretty much helped the community declaring its government when the 
time came in 1948. The Jewish Agency became a state within a state, in other words (Gabbay, 
33 
 
1959). On the other hand, Arab community in Palestine did not have organizations and a legit-
imate representative institution that had the right to decide on all Arabs on the land and create 
a communication with the rest of the world.  
There were several conflicts between Arabs and Jews during the British Mandate however it 
exceeds this study’s limits if all are explained. However, two major conflicts which deserve to 
be mentioned the Wailing Wall Disturbances of 1929 and the great revolt of 1936-39 that were 
mainly caused by migrations and land purchases of the Jewish community clearly showed how 
big the conflict among two groups was. These two communities were disturbed of British man-
date and maybe it was the single thing they would agree on.  
In 1946 the United States and Britain sent the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to Pales-
tine to make recommendations for future policy. The committee said that Palestine should be 
neither Jewish nor Arab but should have a single government. The constitution should protect 
Jewish rights, so the Jewish minority would not be under the control of Arab majority, and a 
UN trusteeship was proposed to facilitate the transition to independence. However, the Jewish 
Agency rejected and said that Zionism was not a tool for the future policies of British govern-
ment. The Zionist movement went on to claim that Palestine was a Jewish state. In February 
1947 Ben-Gurion, one of the most important figures in the history of Israel, told Britain’s for-
eign minister that the Jewish Agency wanted a Jewish state embracing whole of western Pales-
tine. Britain wanted a partition plan from Jewish state but the Jewish Agency refused. In April 
Britain announced that she would leave the Palestine and asked the United Nations to propose 
a solution. Five Arab states wanted the UN General Assembly to consider the problem in Pal-
estine as a matter of end of the British mandate and declaration of her independence on the 
other hand.  
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According to Jewish Agency Palestinian Arabs were not an ethnic group but as a part of other 
Arabs hence, they did not have the right of self-determination and they could not make claim 
on Palestine (Ronen, 1979).  
The Jewish Agency said that modern Jewry is the successor to the ancient Hebrews, who had 
been forced out of Palestine by the Romans. “We are in Palestine as of right. We are at home 
there. Ever since the Jewish People has exited, Palestine has been, remains and will remain their 
national home- and to one’s national home one can always return as of right without having to 
ask anybody else’s leave” said Ben Gurion while claiming that Palestine was national home of 
Jewish community (Quigley, 1990, p. 66). Arab community strongly rejected UN’s partition 
plan and Jewish Agency’s claim of an independent Jewish state and added that it was unac-
ceptable. They were ready to fight against Jews for the land of Palestine that was purchased and 
settled by the Jews.  
Throughout the inter-communal war, the British Administration made little effort to enforce 
order, concentrating instead on preparations for its withdrawal. On May 14, 1948 in the midst 
of the turmoil, and soon, the last British High commissioner, General Alan Cunningham de-
parted from Haifa and British rule in Palestine came to an end. There had been no formal trans-
fer of powers from the British mandate authority to a new local government for the simple 
reason that there was no government but agencies of Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Britain had 
failed to create political institutions in its mandate, instead leaving the Arab and Jewish com-
munities to struggle for supremacy. In this struggle, the Jewish community emerged victorious 
and after a few hours of departure of British High Commissioner proclaimed the independent 
state of Israel and it was immediately recognized by the United States and the Soviet Union 
(Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 266).  
1.7 The first Arab-Israeli war (1948) 
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The first Arab- Israeli war started on May 15, 1948 and did not last until December, the same 
year. Five Arab states tried to invade Israel but Israel defeat of the Arab forces and it was 
Israel’s first great military success on Arab coalition. It also meant the collapse of the UN pro-
posal for a Palestinian Arab State. Moreover, Israeli territory became bigger than it had been 
once in the UN proposal anymore.  There can be various reasons of that defeat as five Arab 
states fought against a newborn state. Main reasons can be counted as each Arab state had their 
own interests in their minds and it resulted in a lack of coordination and the Israeli forces, under 
the overall strategic command of Ben-Gurion, were motivated by the belief that they were en-
gaged in a life-and-death struggle for the very existence of a Jewish state.  Israelis won both 
rounds in May and in July. After the defeat, each of the Arab state signed an armistice agree-
ment with Israel. These agreements were not peace treaties, and they did not constitute recog-
nition of Israel on the part of the Arab signatories; they simply stabilized the cease-fire borders 
without accepting them as final. Palestine had effectively been partitioned among Israel, Egypt, 
and Transjordan. There was no Palestinian Arab state at the end but just an Arab population of 
more than 700,000 people refugees. Separation of Arab population from Palestine began during 
the inter-communal war and was at first the normal reaction of a civilian population to nearby 
fighting- a temporary evacuation from the zone of combat with plans to return once hostilities 
ceased. However, it did not happen as it had been planned and Palestinian Arabs abandoned 
their ancestral soil and city dwellers left behind their homes and businesses. In order to ‘secure’ 
the interior of the Israeli state and protect Jewish settlements lying outside its UN-decreed bor-
ders, the Haganah, Israeli armed forces, in April 1948 authorized a campaign against potentially 
hostile Arab villages. This campaign provided for the conquest and permanent occupation or 
leveling, of Arab villages and town that is known as Plan D. This plan feared the Arab popula-
tion and contributed to the fight among Arabs and Israelis. This enforcement of expulsion of 
Arabs continued until 1949 and during these months only 160,000 Arabs remained within the 
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borders of Israel. In addition to creating the tragedy of displaced Palestinian Arabs, Israelis 
victory-referred to as the War of Independence in Israel- over the invading Arab forces discred-
ited the regimes that had ordered such unprepared units into combat. The Arab defeat took on 
civilizational overtones, bringing about a critical self-examination of the social and political 
bases of Arab life (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 267-271).  
1.8 Israel after 1948 war until 1970s 
In 1948 the nature of the Jewish-Palestinian frontier struggle was radically transformed. The 
inter-communal conflict, which had taken place within the framework of British Mandatory 
rule had now split into two: on the one hand, an international conflict between a number of 
hostile sovereign states and, on the other, an internal frontier struggle between the state of Israel 
and Palestinians who had remained within its territory at the end of the 1948 war. (Shafir & 
Peled, 2002) The war was over but there were still Palestinians who were not welcomed by 
Israelis. Palestinians in the land were seemed as enemies within by the Israeli security forces. 
The main perception was to establish a Jewish nation-state and it was not that easy to achieve 
this goal with the Palestinian Arab population who were still surrendering their lives in the land.  
After its creation Israel had to face with a lot of problems on nation building. It was not easy to 
transform Yishuv into a governmental institution and consequently a state. Political leaders had 
to set up a judicial system, and communal organizations of Yishuv had to be national institu-
tions. Religion was another issue and it was to be decided where to put religion in this newborn 
nation state. In the first years of the independent Israeli state, the political leaders reached a 
consensus on the administrative structure but there were different attitudes on role of religion 
in public life (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 345).   
Israel’s policy on its Arab population was mainly consisted of three ideas. First it was estab-
lished as a state of Jews. This idea expands its responsibility over its borders and includes all 
Jews in the world. The meaning of a Jewish state is reflected not only in the national, official, 
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cultural, and political symbols and means of expression of the state but also in the perception 
that Israel as a homeland for Jews all around the world rather than its inhabitants. Most of the 
national projects, priorities, and institutions were exclusively for Jews. Secondly it is to be gov-
erned like a Western democracy. According to this claim, Israel was established as a democratic 
state and it would be governed by a liberal democracy. However, it was a democracy that was 
enjoyed exclusively by the Jews not the Arabs. It is open to discussion that to what extent Arab 
population had access to this liberal democracy even after they became officially citizens of the 
state of Israel. Finally, it had special security concerns about its Arab population that will con-
tinue until the conflict resolved with all Arabs (Rouhana & Ghanem, 1999).  
These tree ideas still shape the governmentality in Israel to a large extent. The first one is still 
one of the mostly used discourses in the country. It is not a convincing idea that Israel employs 
liberal, democratic policies to every citizen in the country without considering the nationality. 
It is almost impossible to talk about an egalitarian policy towards all people living the state. 
Policies that have been employed for the security reasons have just been excuses of not being 
democratic and egalitarian.  
After the 1948 war, Israel extended her boundaries that were set out in the partition resolution 
in 147 thanks to successes of the armed forces. The most substantial gains were Galilee and the 
western parts of the Jerusalem. It was a more coherent state after the war. However, there were 
still problems of security as the borders were still provisional. The state of Israel had to continue 
her existence in an uneasy state of ongoing tension. In 1950 the Law of Return passed from 
Knesset and this law confirmed that every Jew has the right to come to the state for a permanent 
settlement. Two years later Citizenship Law was enacted which gave immigrants the right of 
citizenship. Transforming the number and the nature of the population brought new problems. 
Jewish groups were coming from Europe (mainly Eastern), USA, Middle East, and Africa and 
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each community brought its culture with them. Middle Eastern Jews had very different expec-
tations from European origin Jews for instance. Moreover it is not possible to claim that every 
single Jew had the capacity to contribute to the state equally. Some of them were coming from 
Hitler’s death camps and some were coming because of their hostile Arab neighbors. The result 
was a permanent change in the composition of the Israeli population that was to have the most 
profound political and social different consequences (Fraser, 2004, p. 49).  
After having several immigrants from those places, the government had to face with the prob-
lem of housing for these new comers. The solution was to settle them down to the houses that 
were empty after deportation of Arabs. By April 1949 about 150,000 Jews settled in these 
houses (Quigley, 1990). These policies, employed by Israel, increased the tension between Is-
rael and her Arab neighbors steadily. Until 1967, both sides were very aware of the fact that the 
tension would not end or decrease. Moreover there was another important developing power; 
Egypt and one of the most important figures in Egypt’s history: Gamal Abdul Nasser.  
In 1954, Israelis were in an uneasy mood as Nasser did his major triumph in foreign policy by 
securing British withdrawal from their bases in the Suez Canal Zone and this move, in a way, 
ended Egypt’s subordination to the old imperialism. Nasser’s relation was also good with the 
United States and this disturbed Israelis. Israeli intelligent services tried to harm his relations 
with the United States but it did not work when their plans came to the light. Israelis were afraid 
of the developments happening in Egypt and they also looked for some support from other 
states. For instance, France gave Israel some high technology planes and tanks. Israel’s ships 
were not allowed to use the Suez Canal and it was also another fact that increased the tension 
between two states. This showed that relations between Israel and Egypt were getting to a more 
dangerous phase that later reasoned the Suez Crisis. Suez Crisis was not only between Israel 
and Egypt but also France, Britain, Soviets, and Unite States were the parties that showed up in 
the conflicts. It was a also a move to weaken Nasser’s prestige and power. However, Nasser 
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emerged from the crisis the hero of the Arab world, a status that he never entirely lost despite 
later setbacks and defeats. In 1958, Egypt and Syria merged under Nasser’s leadership and it 
was the establishment of the United Arab Republic. It was not a unify that would last long as 
in 1961 Syrians rebelled against Nasser regime. It was the beginning of the decline for Nasser. 
Israel, on the other hand, was trying to prove it existence as an independent state in world stage. 
Actually, they did well and by 1966, the Arab-Israeli conflict seemed to set to enter upon a 
more dangerous phase. Israel was now a well-established state and Arab leaders were aware of 
its strength and ability to defend itself. This fact in turn contributed to the growing activism of 
the Palestinians. Palestinian groups were turning to a news militancy that, if it could not threaten 
Israel’s existence, could at least remind Israelis of the uncomfortable fact that major issues had 
been left unresolved. The way was clear for the third Arab-Israeli war (Fraser, 2004). Kibbutz 
communities during that process developed and became one of the most important locomotive 
supporters of the state.  Members of the kibbutz communities helped their state and Jewish 
society almost every field of the life; from food production to security. Kibbutz was like a 
newborn world that was trying to find a place in a newborn state.  In 1967, third Arab-Israeli 
war started. 1967 war that is also called as ‘Six Day War’ or ‘June War’ was a very important 
turning point for both Israelis and Palestinians. Arab states failed to liberate Palestine and Pal-
estinians even lost some other territories. Another important result of the war that the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) transformed from a body of Cairo based bureaucratic notables 
into an independent resistance organization devoted to armed struggle against Israel. Actually, 
just after the defeat of Arab states several guerilla organizations became active in the Gaza Strip 
and Jordan. Al-Fatah, headed by an important figure in Palestinian history, Yasir Arafat, can 
be counted as the most successful one among those organizations. The PLO was like an um-
brella organization of all these organizations and al-Fatah was the one which –maybe- had the 
biggest effect in the PLO. Al-Fatah’s main ideology was to stand away from doctrines like; 
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communism, Ba’thism, and Pan-Arabism but to recover the Palestinian homeland and link the 
modern resistance movement to such historic Palestinian episodes as the 1936-1939 uprising. 
The al-Fatah/PLO leadership succeeded in restoring the Palestinian dimension to the Arab-Is-
raeli conflict and in forging a Palestinian national identity. Another important position of al-
Fatah/PLO was the refusal to endorse UN Resolution 242. They were refusing it because of two 
facts. First, it recognized Israel’s right to exist, and second, according to this resolution; it is 
only a refugee problem and it is not a people with a right to a national homeland. It was not 
only al-Fatah but there were some other organizations fighting against Israel. However, al-Fa-
tah/PLO was the one that also gradually acquired the characteristics of a government in exile 
during 1970s and it developed a complex network of committees and agencies that were en-
gaged in providing social services to Palestinians. The PLO operated schools and medical clin-
ics in the refugee camps and managed a Lebanese-based conglomerate that was involved in a 
variety of manufacturing enterprises. Moreover, it undertook diplomatic initiatives in its drive 
to win acceptance as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It was also received 
recognition as the sole representative of the Palestinians at the Arab summit in 1974 (Cleveland 
& Bunton, 2009, pp. 345-367). It became similar to Yishuv that was created by early Jewish 
settlers of Palestine. Palestinians tried to get together under a political organization and to make 
other states recognize them as nation.  
On one hand, despite Israel’s diplomatic isolation in the Middle East, and the stresses, strains, 
and occasional contradictions within Israeli society itself, the new state managed to forge an 
identity, construct a stable democratic political system, maintain an effective military capabil-
ity, and attract the loyalty and participation of its Jewish citizens in the unique enterprise of 
building a Jewish nation. On the other hand, the emergence of an armed and organized Pales-
tinian resistance movement after 1967 renewed the Palestinians’ sense of themselves as a dis-
tinct national entity deserving of the same recognition as Israel. Although the leaders of the 
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Arab states expressed support for the Palestinian cause, they were reluctant to let the commando 
organizations settle in their states. Because of not being able to find a secure base Palestinian 
guerilla organizations could not be a legitimate force. However, it is an important fact that, the 
Palestinians awakened the international community to realize that Arab-Israeli conflict was a 
matter between the state of Israel and the Palestinian people (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, pp. 
366-367).  
The amazing ability to discover the land without discovering the people dovetailed neatly with 
early Zionist visions. In the minds of many Europeans, especially Zionist Jews, Palestine was 
“empty” before the arrival of the first wave of Jewish settlers in 1880s. “Emptiness,” of course, 
did not denote, except for the most ignorant, the physical absence of the native population. 
Rather, it meant the absence of “civilized” people, in the same sense that the Americans and 
Africa were portrayed as virgin territories ready for waves of pioneers. The famous Zionist 
slogan, “a land without people for a people without a land” was, therefore, but a manifestation 
of a wider European intellectual network characterized by chauvinistic nationalism, racial su-
periority, and imperialistic ambitions. The political implications of the deep-rooted unwilling-
ness to deal openly with the question of the native population were such that the fundamental 
political rights of the Palestinian people, not to mention their very existence, are still a matter 
of contention even today. (Doumani, 1999) In this “empty” land kibbutz communities’ main 
duty was to grow people to fill in with “ideal” people.  
1.9 Kibbutz Communities 
The meaning of kibbutz is “communal settlement” in Hebrew language.  Kibbutz is a unique 
creation that was first established in Israel (Palestine at the time). It is a collective and cooper-
ative society comprised of Jewish people. People, living in kibbutz communities, have the re-
sponsibility of welfare and ownership of its means of production at the same time. It is a move-
ment and deal with almost all governmental and regional issues. Members of the kibbutz work 
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for kibbutz and kibbutz supplies people’s needs and insures the future and good will of its 
members. It is more than a community and it is not an exaggeration to claim that it is kind of a 
small dream world that has its own social structure, cultural events, holiday, life style, moral 
values, etc.  
Most of the founders of kibbutz communities had a high level of formal education and most of 
them came from cities. One of their most important goals was to realize the Zionist idea and 
change the occupational structure of Jewish people from merchants to the farmers. Most of the 
founders of the kibbutz communities already completed their secondary and higher education 
before they arrived to Palestine (Palgi,1998). The first generation kibbutz members came from 
Eastern Europe and they were influenced by socialist idea. Protection of the land was sacred 
for them as it was sacred in Zionist idea. Egalitarianism and labor were also in great importance 
because of the socialist idea. These dynamics motivated first generation kibbutz members to 
create a society on “a land without a people” as they used to describe themselves “a people 
without a land”.  
Members of the classical kibbutz until 1980s were accepted as equals no matter what are their 
occupations, sexes, duties, and responsibilities.  After facing with some political changes in the 
country kibbutz also had to change its policies (except the ones which still insist on classical 
way of kibbutz). The kibbutz management has its secretary, general manager, and some depart-
ment that deal with certain field of the kibbutz. People, working in the administrative bodies, 
are no different than the people who work in the farms or dining room. It has been like a gov-
ernment within a government that works collaboratively with the government. For instance; 
issues like migration, housing, employment are the issues that kibbutz directly involves in and 
produce solutions just like the state. It is not a body of the government but an autonomous 
organization that work for and work with the Israeli government. 
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1.10 Kibbutz: History and contributions to the Yishuv and Israel:  
Kibbutz communities were first established in the late 19th century in Palestine. Their aims 
were not always the same. It was a Zionist organization that was for the good of all Jews in 
Palestine. The idea of kibbutz was primarily for a rapid development of a society by helping 
each other in kibbutz camps or in Yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine before having an 
independent state of Israel, 1948) established with the help of Jewish National Fund (JNF) and 
efforts of people living and sharing a common faith.  
From the deserts of the Negev to the mountains of the upper Galilee, the Israeli landscape is 
dotted with over 300 kibbutzim (collective agricultural settlements). Divided into several fed-
erations on the basis of varying ideological and structural criteria, their similarities are funda-
mental enough to permit us- and them- to refer to them collectively as “the kibbutz movement”. 
This population is of much greater importance than its numerical strength would indicate. Its 
ideals were instrumental in bringing the young state into being; from its workforce the country 
obtained its most valiant fighters for defense against a foreign attack which threatened its very 
existence; its representatives occupy important positions of leadership in almost all phases of 
contemporary Israeli life. (Spiro M. E., 1965, p. 3) 
“One of the major assumptions behind the thought and actions of all major kibbutz movements 
has always been that the kibbutz can, and should, influence the rest of society. and means have 
varied greatly. All of them, however, aim at applying values of the kibbutz - Zionism, self-
labor, equality, democracy, and mutual responsibility-to the State of Israel as whole” (Near, 
1986- Summer Autumn, p. 189). Kibbutz was open to all who were ready to accept the princi-
ples of Zionism and adopt the kibbutz way of life, it aimed to expand until included the whole 
of the working class; and since the both of the kibbutz and of the workers’ movement as a whole 
was to build a Jewish society in Palestine, in collaboration with the bourgeoisie, and indeed, 
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with all sectors of the Jewish people (Near, 1986- Summer Autumn). It is to be noted that Kib-
butz communes were different from many other similar, utopian communities. One of the most 
distinguishing principle of Kibbutz was that it was not consisted of working class people but 
rather a great number of the members were mainly from middle-class intellectuals and religion 
was not the main motivation of the communes like it was in a lot of utopian communities but 
egalitarianism was to be protected in these secular communes (more than 80% of kibbutz is 
secular), among all members. 
In 1960s, classical kibbutz movement ends when it had 229 kibbutzim and more than 85,000 
members while once it had one kibbutz and 11 members.  It was only three percent of the total 
Jewish population in Israel. However, it was producing 33 percent of the gross national farm 
product, five percent of the gross national industrial product, and 12 percent of the total gross 
national product. Kibbutz communities also did great contributions to the both Jewish economy 
and army. For example, in order to gain more land the early Kibbutz communities settled on 
drained malarial swampland for agricultural land development. Members of the Kibbutz com-
munities also settled on the borders and constituted self-defense units against Arabs in Palestine 
in order to protect Jewish community. Thanks to their success and devotion to the Jewish com-
munity and Zionist ideology they were also represented disproportionally in the Jewish army 
before Israel had gained her independence which is called Haganaand in the leadership of its 
commando units Palmach and they have comprised a disproportionate percentage of the officer 
corps of the Israeli army and air force. After the establishment of the state of Israel, in 1969, 
even though Kibbutz communities were only three percent of the total population, 16 percent 
of the cabinet and 15 of the 120 members parliament and four prime minister were from Kibbutz 
communities (Spiro M. E., Utopia and Its Discontents: The Kibbutz and Its Historical 
Vicissitudes, 2004).  
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1.11 Life and Social Values in Kibbutz: The central moral value of the culture of the classic 
kibbutz was social, economic, political equality, and togetherness. Main purpose of this egali-
tarian system was to create collective ownership of property like land, housing, and producer 
goods (Spiro M. E., Utopia and Its Discontents: The Kibbutz and Its Historical Vicissitudes, 
2004). Egalitarianism was the basic principle of the Kibbutz. Almost each member had the right 
to live under same conditions and each had to obey the laws and routines of the community. Of 
course there were some (small) differences between the first settlers and the new comers but it 
is not possible to say there were classes or privileges according to members’ families or occu-
pations until the late of 1970s when capitalism first introduced to kibbutz. However, it is pos-
sible to say there were age groups and it was a differing point. Some members were the founders 
of the Kibbutz communities and some were born in the community and some of them were the 
later settler, who arrived after their migration to Palestine. Property used in Kibbutz belongs to 
all members as all members produced it no matter their time of arrival. Everyone had a contri-
bution in the making of a property and consequently everyone has the right on every single 
property.  
Mutual responsibility has been one of the basic principles of the Kibbutz. Both success and the 
failure belong to all members. All members of the Kibbutz communities deal with problems no 
matter whose mistakes they are. Members work according to their abilities but physical abilities 
are preferable than the intellectual abilities. The most devoted woman or man who was making 
great contributions to the establishment and the improvement of the community was the one 
respected most. If you want to be respected, you were to be hardworking. In the movie of An-
drzej Warda, Man of Marble (1976), there is a bricklayer who becomes a symbol later in the 
country and showed as the expected citizen by Polish government to Polish people at the time. 
Birkut’s physical ability and devotion to his country is to be appreciated (Warda, 1976). It can 
easily be observed in kibbutz communities too, that you should be capable of doing works, 
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which requires physical effort to be a more beneficial member. Kibbutz expects you do some-
thing for the community before you do something for yourself. One of the Kibbutz members, 
for instance, says, “I wanted study philosophy but he was asked to study something else. How-
ever, he insisted on studying philosophy and he was asked to study sociology at the same time, 
then.” (Freilich, Inventing Our Life: The Kibbutz Experiment, 2010). Kibbutz management 
gives advice to the student in order to grow him as a beneficial member to kibbutz. There is a 
general assembly in the Kibbutz communities that bounds all members tightly to each other. 
Motivation of Kibbutz members was mainly based on a dream society in which everybody feels 
safe and do not have to think about their future. There is no bill to be paid, no need to think 
about their children’s education, no fear of facing with expenditures of health services, etc. All 
members work for the Kibbutz and they are very aware of the fact that Kibbutz is with them 
until their last breath. Kibbutz cared of all its members until the late of 1970s and members did 
not have to think about their future until that time. Hence, members worked for the Kibbutz not 
for themselves thanks to that reality.  
Kibbutz members did not have a lot in private. They thought that privacy could destroy their 
togetherness. During the day, they worked in different fields and completed their duties. In the 
evenings, they got together in the communal dining room instead of going their small apart-
ments where they slept. Communal dining room was the place where they learnt about recent 
news, developments, announcements, and discussed about the problems and their possible so-
lutions.  It is a kind of gathering point where they felt their togetherness and observe their 
capability. A new way of living was possible according to members as long as they worked 
together and did their best for the community. In a song, often sung in the Kibbutz, for instance, 
they sang, “We have come to our land to build and to be rebuilt in her.” Kibbutz members 
devoted their lives to develop the land that they think belongs to them and to be rebuilt in that 
land by living and working altogether.   
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Kibbutz members preferred to live a simple life until 1980s. A simple way of living was not 
something disturbing the members but it was something that convinced them that they did not 
need own materials individually. As long as they can live –even at the minimum standards- it 
was not a big issue for them. They had a goal of creating a developed, democratic, egalitarian 
society and hence owning something individually or desire of luxury was out of the topic. De-
spite the fact that most of the members who came from East Europe or the USA and were from 
middle class, they believed that they could build a dream society and during the process of 
building that society they could suffer and would not want a life that they once had had.  Finan-
cial resources were not adequate but even if they were used for other purposes (on military 
expenditures, building houses for newcomers, etc.) they would not feel wretched because they 
did not get enough, as their motivation was not based on materials but mainly on moral values.  
Maybe, as a result of living in a peaceful environment, where crime rate is very low, and safe 
–at least in the camps that were far to the clashes with Arabs in 1960s, kibbutz members com-
prised “a disproportionately high percentage of the country’s distinguished novelists and poets, 
as well as disproportionately low percentage of its criminals: As late as the 1970s, the total 
recorded kibbutz crime consisted of one murder and one embezzlement” (Spiro M. E., Utopia 
and Its Discontents: The Kibbutz and Its Historical Vicissitudes, 2004, p. 559). It is not possible 
to live your life individually in Kibbutz but it is very difficult to find an illiterate or a criminal 
individual in the Kibbutz, too.  
1.12 Family structure:  
Kibbutz is a very big family and in this family it is not possible to say that small families are as 
important as that big family. Especially for the first settlers, it was a big issue to create an 
understanding of sexual behavior. There were opposing ideas on how to create relationship and 
to what extend could these relationships proceed. Then, some descriptions were made on rela-
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tionships and marriage. When a couple decided to get married they did not used the terms “hus-
band” and “wife” but instead they accepted it that a young woman acquires a young man, and 
a young man acquires a young woman. The problematic of having families survived in Kibbutz 
for a very long time. Members of the Kibbutz communities believed that strong family ties 
could decay the idea of togetherness if a woman and a man had strong feelings to each other 
and consequently their family. It could even lead to create their own “union”- family and dis-
connect their ties from the Kibbutz community that was the mostly accepted and seemed as the 
biggest family. Divorcing was common at the beginning as the idea of getting married was not 
digested because of the dominant socialist ideology but it became rare later when the married 
couples got older and their children and grandchildren did not want their parents and grandpar-
ents get divorced. Another problem was having a child. Most of the first couples did not want 
to have children until certain conditions got better. It was not a good idea to bring a child into 
world at the time until geographic and economic conditions of the kibbutz improved.  
Another problem with marriage was that it was seemed as bourgeois tradition and a bourgeois 
tradition had no place in Kibbutz communities until 1980s. Woman is to be free in Kibbutz and 
having a traditional husband or family was a big threat to her. According to Kibbutz members, 
the bourgeois woman is little better than a servant. She has few legal rights or political privi-
leges, and she is economically and socially dependent upon her husband. A bourgeois woman’s 
place is the home and her main task is serving her husband and her children. However, in kib-
butz, woman is to be equal of man in all matters and it was not possible in traditional bourgeois 
society. A woman must not be dependent on her husband in any discourse. Husband’s job could 
not be something to be proud of and his status could not affect her wife’s. Kibbutz succeeded 
it and established a society in which both women and men had equal statuses and even –except 
some rare situations- they did any job regardless of their sexes: men worked at home, cooked, 
49 
 
did the cleaning and women worked in the farms, drove tractors, etc. (Spiro M. E., Venture in 
Utopia, 1963).  
It is very clear that marriage in Kibbutz has a different meaning from the commonly accepted 
idea of marriage. On one hand, there is a division of labor and just because of being a man you 
cannot have privileges. A man gets up at a certain time and works for a certain time and has his 
dinner in the communal dining room just exactly a woman does. On the other hand, in the 
classical family father has a special authority and it widely accepted that he always has his word 
for his daughter or son and it is his natural right. However, in Kibbutz, father has no special 
responsibility of his child because Kibbutz –as a whole- cares of the child. Fathers rear their 
children but children get their food, clothes, books, etc. from the kibbutz. Kibbutz considerably 
weakened father’s authority by ending his economical support to the child and by supplying 
anything that a child would need. Mothers, however, had to bear children and this somehow 
was making them be one step back from the man, as they had to deal with a pregnancy process 
for months. While they had to suffer during these months, Kibbutz tried to save her time by 
establishing communal dining room, laundry, childcare services in order to save a considerable 
much time for woman’s own development. Thanks to these communal services, women had 
time for themselves and to work for the Kibbutz as much as men did.  
The Kibbutz has succeeded in eliminating most of the characteristic and functions of the tradi-
tional family. Fathers as well as mothers did not have much responsibility for especially the 
physical care of their children thanks to communal child growing. The relationship among cou-
ples did not include economic cooperation and parents and their children did not have common 
residence. Murdock claims that: “Sexual unions without economic cooperation are common 
and there are relationships between men and women involving a division of labor without sex-
ual grafication… but marriage exists only when the economic and the sexual are united into 
one relationship” (Murdock, 1949, p. 8). However, in Kibbutz there is neither an economical 
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cooperation of parents nor a common residence and in this context it clear that family has a 
very different description from the mainstream (Spiro M. E., Venture in Utopia, 1963).  
1.13 Education: 
One of the most important points to be focused on education in Kibbutz communities is the fact 
that they were collective. Its characteristic feature is that the children live in communal nurse-
ries with age peers, where they are reared by “nurses,” nursery teachers, and teachers, but by 
their parents. Since parents of both sexes work in the kibbutz economy, the daily interaction 
between parent and child is in general restricted to the interval between the parents’ return from 
work in the afternoon and the child’s bedtime. It was not very possible for a parent to see her/his 
child –which later became a very big issue when parents wanted to live with their children and 
grow them up in 1970s- except the determined times. In kibbutz when a child is born he doesn’t 
become an official member of Kibbutz just because she/he was born in there. She/he becomes 
a member of the Children’s Society (chevratyeladim) and upon her/his graduation from high 
school he is elected to membership in the kibbutz. They are free not to choose living in kibbutz 
and go on their lives outside the kibbutz. However, kibbutz community just announces their 
candidacy they have to be elected to the kibbutz community. They do not have the right of 
going on their lives in kibbutz just because they want to. It is not their destiny to last their lives 
in kibbutz. Parents leave their child to the kibbutz educational system when she/he is four or 
five days old. Children are taken care by infants’ nurses and their responsibility is more than 
infants’ parents. Children are left to these nurses but this does not mean that their parents do 
not see them. Their fathers, at least once; and their mother for several times visit their children 
to visit and also to nurse them. When the child is six months old he may be taken to his parents’ 
room in the afternoon for about an hour. At the age of one year the child is moved from the 
Nursery to the Toddlers’ House (bethpeutot) where the child is toilet trained, he is taught to 
feed herself/himself and learns to interact with his age-mates. At that age the child can see 
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her/his parents more often: two hours in the evening and not just on Saturdays but also some-
times on the days when the parents are off. In their fourth or fifth birthdays children pass to the 
Kindergarten (gan): a new building and a new environment. In this new environment, they do 
not only change the building but also they meet a new nurse and a Kindergarten teacher and 
this new group is two times more crowded then the Toddlers’ House in which eight children 
are trained together because two groups from different Toddlers’ Houses come together in one 
Kindergarten. Children live in these groups until they reach high school age. These groups are 
important for the children as they live with these group members a relatively long time at very 
important ages. Between the ages of five and six children leave Kindergarten and pass to Tran-
sitional Class (kitatma’avar), in which they their first formal intellectual instruction, including 
the study of reading and writing. After that they start the primary school and move to its dor-
mitory. It is the first time they meet different age peers: from seven to twelve. Each group has 
sixteen members and has its own teacher, classroom, and bedrooms but the entire student body 
eats together, plays together, and participates in the same extracurricular activities where they 
meet the sense of togetherness. At the age o twelve they enter the high school. They leave their 
group, their group splits up and they start encountering other male educational figures after 
their fathers. They also start to work in the Kibbutz economy. Kibbutz expect them to leave the 
community and live outside the Kibbutz for one year to experience the life out of the Kibbutz 
and after completing their one year they can be a candidate for the election of a full membership 
of kibbutz (Spiro M. E., 1965).  
1.14 Labor: Labor (especially physical) in Kibbutz is very important for all of the members. It 
is very rare to work in Kibbutz for people who are not members except in certain situations. It 
is only possible when there are not any skilled or qualified people to work. It was a kind of 
nationalization of the labor.  
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It was determined daily or weekly who would work in what field in Kibbutz. Women, men, and 
children (old enough to work for Kibbutz) worked in the determined assignments. Working 
people were checked over when it was needed. Moreover, people were trained for some occu-
pations, which needed a special expertise. Working hours were determined according to the 
type of the work and the season but it was usually about 40-50 hours a week and Saturdays 
were official holidays. It is rare to hire labor for works in Kibbutz as long as there was someone 
who could overcome the task (Öksüz, 1977).  
It was aimed to make kibbutz a place of its members. Thus, all working people were to be 
chosen from the members. There were three main arguments against hiring people.  
First, there was mystique of labor – already hinted at-which stresses the dignity and creativeness 
of labor and the need to strike roots in the soil.  Then, there is the fear, which first arose when 
the Arabs were the majority group in Palestine that the introduction of hired labor would open 
the way to the employment of cheap Arab fellah labor. If this happened, it was thought, the 
Kibbutz would eventually become a plantation, worked by Arab labor for the benefit of (what 
would then become) the leisure class Kibbutz owners. The socialist ideology of Kibbutz, with 
its abhorrence of “surplus value” and its notion that all wage labor entails exploitation, is the 
third ethical opposition to hired labor and the insistence on self-labor. (Spiro M. E., Venture in 
Utopia, 1963, p. 15)  
However, Kibbutz was trying to create a society in which no class is to exist, and people would 
live under egalitarian social policies.  In Kibbutz communities, egalitarianism was maybe the 
most important value that was accepted by almost all members. Workload on the other hand 
was based on the ability. Physical contribution was in great importance in Kibbutz. People who 
work in the farms especially in harvest times had great prestige thanks to their great effort and 
economical contributions to the community. People worked in these communities according to 
their ability. Talent or intellectually was at the second plan. Physical labor was seemed as a plus 
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as most of the work was based on agriculture and physical labor thus, was more important. In 
Kibbutz, at the very beginning of its establishment, members even were not paid because they 
did not need money, as there was nothing to be bought. The Kibbutz supplied almost everything 
and you could not use money to buy or afford something. 
Working for Kibbutz used to start when the students were in high school. It had two main 
purposes. First, it had a great contribution to the Kibbutz economy, and secondly, it used to 
prepare these young members to their adult economic roles. The principle underlying the dis-
tribution of work is that they made their choice on in which field to work. They chose from two 
main working areas: productive branches and service branches. Labor in Kibbutz mainly di-
vided into two categories: productive and non-productive labor. Productive labor yields a cash 
return and it has two sub categories. These are: A. work in the agricultural branches of the 
Kibbutz, hired labor outside the Kibbutz (members who were employed outside the Kibbutz, 
construction work; capital improvement, managerial work, youth leadership (hired leaders and 
teachers).  B. Work that does not yield any income: Service (like, tailor shop, laundry, kitchen, 
etc.) It is important to note that, almost 50 per cent of the Kibbutz population was in “non-
productive” work and the other half had to produce for “non-productive” half too (Spiro M. E., 
1965).   
Sexual division of labor was a challenging trouble that Kibbutz had to deal with. In order to 
discourage the development of any sexual division of labor both sexes started working in ser-
vice and productive branches while they were high school students. However, physical inequal-
ities and differences among sexes often made girls and boys insist on certain occupations (Spiro 
M. E., 1965). As it was explained in the family structure in Kibbutz part above, women were 
not seen as the members who should work in their apartments and take care of their children. 
Rather, they were seemed as equals of the men and worked in any field according to their ca-
pability. Both sexes were doing their bids in the dining room just like in the farms. In order to 
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free women from household chores and accept them as members but not women Kibbutz com-
munalized all workload.   
As mentioned above there were several fields to work in a Kibbutz community; nursing the 
children, cooking, cleaning, farming, etc. No single job had a priority including administrative 
parts. You were no different than a cook even you have a more prestigious job like an engineer 
or doctor, etc. Every member were doing their bid and getting according to her/his need from 
the total production.  
1.15 Period of stagnation and decreasing moral values: 
10 moral principles of kibbutz communities:  
1. A man of truth 
2. Loyal to his people  
3. A brother to his fellow  
4. A helpful and dependable brother 
5. A lover of nature 
6. Obedient to the orders of his leader  
7. Joyful and gay  
8. Economical and generous  
9. A man of courage  
10. Pure in thoughts, words, and deeds.  
(Spiro M. E., 1965, p. 43) 
As Spiro mentions in his book Venture in Utopia these were the 10 principles of kibbutz mem-
bers that later changed a lot. Did kibbutz decline result from the vanishing of high-moral leaders 
and the rise of lower-moral, self-serving power holders who caused descending trust spirals that 
stopped original solutions and ruined uniqueness (Shapira A. , 2010)? It is possible to claim 
that there was a loss of moral values which ones kibbutz had. 10 principles were quite important 
for the members especially until 1970s when kibbutz communities met capitalism and political 
changes Israeli government employed. Individualist view was the most important challenging 
fact that affected kibbutz communities that much. Instead of being a helpful and dependable 
member, members preferred to question the way of living in kibbutz. There were several factors 
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that made them change their thought. One of them was, for instance, was managers’ high stand-
ards of living. A member working in the plants of the kibbutz for hours did not get the same 
salary or opportunities as did the managers. Each single member was trying to be economical 
on their spends at the classical kibbutz communities but after getting improved, some members, 
especially ones in the administrative bodies, started living a “luxury” life and it was just oppo-
site the kibbutz philosophy.  
At the beginning all members were well motivated as they escaped from countries where anti-
Semitism was at their peaks. It was a place for these newcomer Jewish people where they could 
build a new life. The kibbutz society was cooperative, democratic, and egalitarian and being a 
society like this and difficult conditions in Palestine at the time shaped a lot its way of living 
and structures (Palgi, 1998). However, change in salaries, privileges –especially- for the man-
aging bodies, private ownership, etc. damaged the egalitarianism principle in Kibbutz.  “The 
complexity of large organizational systems helps leaders mask their self-perpetuation of dys-
functional domination” (Shapira R. , Rethinking the Reverence of Stalinism in the Two Major 
Kibbutz Movements, 2016). It is to be taken into consideration that when the movement’s ca-
pacity became that large it was difficult to control every single body. Corruption or misuse of 
the sources became a huge problem that needed an emergent solution. However, in order to find 
a solution kibbutz communities needed unification, which was once easy as the main goal was 
just to create a dream society and state and there were a lot of people sharing the same dream 
and not expecting a lot of things individually.  
Kibbutz is a successful organization if its long life is to be taken into consideration. It was 
founded more than a century ago and however less in popularity and effectiveness when it is 
compared to in 1960s and 1970s as people were more unified worked collectively for some 
mutual goals. There are still Kibbutz communities in Israel even bigger in size and population. 
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Kibbutz communities were established and survived mainly under a socialist ideology. How-
ever, after the introduction of industrialization and capitalism to the Kibbutz, they had to deal 
with a lot of problems. Imitating capitalist firms made great harm on Kibbutz’s structure. 
Change is not an easy action in Kibbutz because it has a lot of traditional ties. Another point 
that made Kibbutz communities weaken was the changing population as it was not possible to 
find people who were working for Kibbutz and who were devoted to their ideals as they once 
were. Second and third generation Kibbutz members started to discover the life outside the 
kibbutz and they were not satisfied with just their community and dreams rather they thought 
kibbutz needed a change as they were not living in an age when the agriculture is that important 
as mentioned above in Labor in Kibbutz part. 
To deal with attrition, social stagnation, and economic competition, the kibbutzim had to open 
up. They accepted new members who were less committed ideologically and less bound by 
shared history. They took in the hordes of foreign volunteers who flooded Israel after the 1967 
war. As the world was being ushered in, kibbutz members were gazing and venturing out, vis-
iting the city, travelling abroad, watching TV. Their aspirations, tastes, and calculations were 
being altered. Long-suppressed yearnings for individual autonomy and personal space began to 
surface, overwhelming the old slogans of togetherness and equality. (Shpancer, 2011) Says a 
Kibbutz member, Noam Shpancer, in an interview and explains his point of view on why Kib-
butz lost its popularity and weakened that much. 
In the mid 1980s, Israel was dealing with a lot of economic problems. The inflation rate was 
more than 400 percent and high unemployment affected the society and consequently, the kib-
butz. However, unemployment was not something tolerable for kibbutz members as they were 
strictly depended on kibbutz community and trusted on the fact that kibbutz would take care of 
them (Leviatan, 2003, pp. 7-8). It was the time when noe-liberalism was introduced to Israel 
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and consequently to kibbutz communities. It did not happen as they expected and a crisis in 
kibbutz communities also broke out and did not calm down for a long time.  
Today there are still a lot of kibbutz communities in Israel and most of them are secular. In 
2010 there were 275 kibbutz communities but only 60 of them operate completely collective. 
There are about 140.000 people living in kibbutz in 2010.  The numbers are more than they 
were in 1960s and 1970s but it was more than 3 percent of Israel’s population at the time, which 
was only 1.6 percent in of the total population of Israel in 2010 (Sherwood, 2012).  Kibbutz is 
bigger in size of population and production today but it is not the community once it was es-
tablished. It is difficult to observe the same moral values –egalitarianism, democracy, and class-
less structure, etc. - today. Rather, most of the kibbutz communities operate like a capitalist 
firm that even give internship opportunities to students from abroad.  
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Chapter 2 
Turkey and Village Institutes 
In this chapter the focus is Village Institutes and establishment and modernization period of 
Turkey. Village Institutes is a project of Turkish Republic, which came to the agenda of the 
government in 1937 and after several discussions, at the end, they were established in 1940. It 
was one of the projects of modernization in the Republic. There had been some other projects 
like People’s Houses (Halk Evleri) and employed polices which formed a basis for Village 
Institutes. In order to have better understanding of the reasons of the establishment of Village 
Institutes some important modernization movements and historical developments of the Repub-
lic are explained in this chapter too.  
2.1 Modernization of Turkey from late Ottoman to early Republican Era:  
Westernization has always become an important discussion since the late Ottoman period. It is 
still a matter of debate even today, in Turkey. There have been several discussions on Western-
ization and mainstream ones are: Do we really need to adapt to Western way? Is not there 
another choice? To what extent are we to adapt our country to Western way?  
Ottoman Empire was always in touch with Western Civilization but during the expansion pe-
riod West was seen as at a lower level than the Ottomans but at the period of stagnation West 
was seen as superior –at least- on military field and it became a problem whether to take it as a 
role model or not. Consequently at the beginning of the 18th century it became an important 
governmental issue that how to bring the military institutions and arm power of the West to 
Ottoman Empire. By the end of the 18th century in 1780s there was a common opinion that at 
least technological progress was to be brought to the Empire. In order to follow these techno-
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logical improvements some statesmen were sent to some capital cities of Europe as ambassa-
dors. However, not just military advances but also some sociological changes came to the Em-
pire. It was observed that Western civilizations were employing policies for the welfare of the 
individuals. Its response in the Ottoman Empire was quite different, unfortunately. This mis-
conception of administrative class in the Empire leaded this class insist on some privileges that 
opened a new age that is called as LaleDevri (Tulip Era). It soon got the reaction of middle and 
low class people and by getting the support of Yeniceri (Janissary) and enemies of the Sadrazam 
(Grand Vizier) revolted against the Padisah (Sultan) that is called PatronaIsyani (Patrona Re-
volt). People living under Ottoman rule and later under Turkish Republic often thought that 
relations created with the West is forgetting society’s good and this revolt –Patrona- was only 
a beginning which would late went on with Kabakci Revolt, Kuleli Issue, and 31st March Move-
ment. Efforts of taking West’s military institutions as a model fastened in the periods of Sultan 
Mahmud I, Sultan Abdulhamid I, and Sultan Selim III between the years of 1730 and 1807 but 
it was interrupted by the traditional Ottoman culture and people whose subsistence was imper-
illed. At the time embassies were established in the West and thanks to these embassies it be-
came possible to make systematic evaluations about Europe. All these developments caused a 
general reorganization/correction that is called Tanzimat in 1839 (Mardin Ş. , 2012, pp. 9-19).  
2.2 Tanzimat Era: 
During the first half of the 19th century, people, living in the Ottoman Empire, had more chance 
to travel around Europe. This led them see that Europe was in advance in science, education, 
military, etc. and made them aware of the backwardness and poverty of their own country in 
contrast to Europe. This made a major change in the question that was in people’s minds for a 
long time: Why is the Empire declining? The question was ‘Why is the Empire declining while 
Europe advances and progresses, and what their secret of success is?’ (Lewis, The Emergence 
of Modern Turkey, 1968) 
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The years from 1836 to 1876 is called Tanzimat period in Ottoman history and it is the period 
when the reforms were at their most intensive level. The reforms did not come from only sultans 
but from the new Ottoman bureaucrats who were educated in ‘westernized’ schools. There were 
some very efficient bureaucrats like Rashid Pasha, Ali Pasha, and Fuat Pasha who mainly 
worked in the translation offices of the Empire and worked abroad for the Empire and came 
back to the Empire and occupied crucial positions –some even became the grand vizier-. They 
played important roles on carrying out important changes in the Empire’s history. Tanzimat 
(Hatt-i Sharif of Gülhane) was one of these remarkable changes in which Sultan Mahmud II 
promised certain administrative reforms. Three of the most important titles of Tanzimat can be 
sort as the abolition of tax for farming, standardization of military conscription, and the elimi-
nation of corruption. These titles had been expressed before Tanzimat but what made Tanzimat 
that important was that it was for the whole society regardless of one’s religion. After Crimean 
War in 1856, Tanzimat was repeated in Hatt-iHümayan declaration and equality became more 
explicit in this new one. In this new one, it was guaranteed that Muslim and non-Muslims were 
to be equal in obligations in terms of military service and to have the same opportunities in state 
employment and to have the right of education in state schools. These two decrees aimed to 
ensure the loyalty of non-Muslim, especially Christian people, when nationalist ideology was 
growing in Europe. It was aimed to weaken the religious and cultural dominance of the millet, 
which had been the governing group since the establishment of the Empire and to establish a 
new definition of people in the Empire.  In 1869, Nationality Law was proclaimed which ac-
cepted that all people living in the Ottoman Empire share a common citizenship regardless of 
their religions. In order to keep the Empire together, the statesmen and bureaucrats introduced 
a secular concept. In this new concept of the Empire reforms were made in education and judi-
cial system too. On one hand, in the educational field news schools were opened for higher 
learning for civilians and in 1847 Ministry of Education was established. These developments 
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in the Empire helped to reach to the areas and people, which once was not possible. In judicial 
area, on the other hand, new legal codes- The Mejelle, was introduced. However, shari’ahwas 
still in use and no matter that Western law’s effect on commercial or maritime codes, the civil 
codes for people in the Empire still remained in an Islamic framework (Cleveland & Bunton, 
2009).   
Sultans of the time made some reforms in order to make the military and the Empire more 
modern, more Western, and tried to protect its unity and territories. Tanzimat literally means 
reorganization. In this reorganization period, there were some notable changes like collapsing 
the Janissaries who had a great power in the Empire for centuries. However, it was still not a 
secular state as there were a lot of religious schools and majority of the population were Mus-
lims who had privileges and that was something disturbing the minorities who were comparing 
their situations with Western democracies. Another disturbance was in the majority. Muslims 
were disturbed as the state was becoming more Western and their power somehow was weak-
ening. By establishing Western style schools the Empire tried to reach its subjects who could 
work in the governmental offices and compete with Western states. Graduates of these schools 
started occupying the occupations in the governmental offices and became the new elite class 
of the society. This development disturbed the Muslim majority whose children were educated 
in religious schools and faced with unemployment. Subjects who were educated in Western 
style schools came to the important positions in the governmental offices and forced Sultans to 
make reforms during that era. It was somehow a governing elite class and this class did not stop 
trying to make reforms and modernize (Westernize) the Empire even after Tanzimat Era.  
2.3 Sultan Abdul Hamid II: 
Abdul Hamid came to power with some new ideas that oppose to the reforms of the Tanzimat 
Era. His main conception was to return the power to Muslim majority and to undo the reforms 
especially for the good of minorities that were made during the Tanzimat. Modernization and 
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Westernization of the education had immense importance for Abdul Hamid II, too. He believed 
that in order to become a strong Empire again, his subjects were to learn about new scientific 
and technological development in positive sciences that Western people had already known and 
processed much farther than his people. However, while educating his subjects he thought in 
order to unify the people in the Empire he had to keep them under the umbrella of Islam and 
his view got strong reactions from people especially who were graduated from Western style 
schools during the time of the Tanzimat.  
2.4 Young Turks Revolt and Committee of Union and Progress (CUP): 
The Young Turks were a group of people consisted of high-ranking officers who were trying 
to make Sultan Abdul Hamid II return and accept the rules of Tanzimat Era and they even add 
some basic democratic rights i.e. freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of press. 
Another important ideology common among the Young Turks’ program was that they wanted 
to nationalize the country like Western states. However, it could not be that easy in the hetero-
geneous Ottoman Empire and to make the Sultan step back. The movement of Young Turks 
was consisted of three major groups: an exile community, some discontented civil servants and 
students, and a coalition of disaffected army officers. The main ideology was opposing the 
oppressive regime of the palace and establishing a democratic regime in order to save the state. 
Their main aims were preserving the territories and restoration of Ottomanism ideology. 
Among Young Turks a movement was established called as Committee of Union and Progress 
(CUP), which was trying to get the rights back and restore the Empire’s policies after Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II closed the parliament and tried to create a centralized authority. Its participants 
were from mainly graduates of European-style schools and they believed in the urgency of 
restoring a constitutional regime because of the Sultan’s authoritarian policies. Members of the 
CUP faced with several attacks from the Sultan like being arrested or exiled but they did not 
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stop struggling for their ideals. The Empire was weakening day by day and it was almost im-
possible to keep the left territories. This situation helped CUP to find ground and supporters 
from different parts of the governmental offices, especially from the military bodies whose 
salaries were decreasing and often interrupted. The CUP believed that the Sultan was under-
mining the power of the army and that was why they were losing territories. In the summer of 
1908, third army staged a revolt and warned the Sultan to restore the constitution or they would 
march on Istanbul and they would do it themselves. Sultan accepted the demand on July 24 and 
constitution was established again. However, everyone was not enthusiastic for a European 
institution and in spring 1909 a counterrevolution broke out against the new government by 
common soldiers and theological students in Istanbul. Their claim was to bring the shari’ah 
back and refusal of the Europeanized army officers but Third Army intervened directly and put 
down the revolts. Abdul Hamid II was accused of supporting the revolt secretly and he tried to 
protect himself by getting the help of a declaration, declared by the shaykh al-Islam. However, 
even this declaration did not save Abdul Hamid II and he was sent to exile to Salonika in and 
he was replaced by his younger brother Mehmet V who did not have much power rather he was 
just little more than a figurehead. Among the years 1909-1913 the state witnessed a struggle for 
power between the CUP and shifting coalitions of liberals and conservatives. However, the 
CUP gained full control of the government in 1913 and it was able to consolidate its power as 
a military dictatorship. Three important figures: Enver, Talat, and Jamal Pasha was leading the 
CUP. Enver and Jamal were both from modest origins and they were graduates of new educa-
tional institutions that were established during the Tanzimat Era. Talat on the other hand came 
from a poor family and occupied cadres that were in immense importance – even became the 
grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). These pashas who studied in 
the Westernized schools and rebelled against the Sultan were expected to brought the power of 
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the Sultan back. However, after studying in these schools they started to question the sole au-
thority of the Sultan and looked for another option while the Empire’s situation was getting 
worse day by day. It is a widely used idiom for situations like that ‘shooting your own foot’ in 
Turkish and after facing with a revolt from students who graduated from schools that were 
founded in order for a cure for the Empire this idiom has often been used for the Sultan, too.  
The movement was controlled by the officers and people most of who were not from loyal or 
rich families but by the ones who were educated mostly in the Western style schools that were 
established during the Tanzimat. The shape of the policies of the state changed as result of these 
participants’ ideologies that were influenced greatly by the Western ideology. These people 
tried to change the autocratic, monarchic and mainly Islamic government into a democratic and 
secular one. However, it was not an easy to task to decide how to shape the new government in 
the eve of World War I. Ottomans continued losing territories especially in the Balkans and 
these loses damaged the prestige of the CUP. There were some mainstream ideologies during 
the period of the CUP i.e pan-Turkism, pan-Ottomanism but the heterogeneous population was 
a big challenge for any nationalistic ideology as there were still several peoples from different 
ethnic origins, living under the CUP’s rule.  
Mehmet ZiyaGokalp, a member of the CUP, was one of the influential ideologists who shaped 
the Turkism at the time and his ideology still finds followers today in Turkey. In his book, 
Türkçülüğün Esasları (the Principles of Turkism), he describes the framework of being Turkish 
and how to create a common nation by using common cultural values. Gokalp sums up 10 basic 
principles which shapes the Turkish national identity and emphasizes the importance of a com-
mon culture and a common language (according to him there are basic language roots that are 
used by any individual living the country and it has been inherited from Ottomans) believes 
that it is one of the most important values that can keep the peoples of the country together 
(Gökalp, 1968).  
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It is difficult to define the government, established by the CUP, as democratic but it has become 
a milestone in the modernization and democratization of Turkey. It was a regime shift and 
opened the way to people participate in the policy making process, after several clashes. How-
ever, it did not become possible to define the state as democratic until 1950s.  
2.5 World War I –Collapse of the Ottoman Empire: 
When the World War I (WWI) started, the government started to think about what action to be 
taken. There was a majority who were supporting to be neutral but the CUP decided on entering 
the war and gaining some of the lost territories back. Even though losing at the end, people – 
civilian and military- endured for four years to defend their state. Almost one million people 
mobilized during the war and this fact also fact led to a social change in the country. Lack of 
men gave the opportunity to women to be employed in the civil service and in the mainstream 
professions. In 1917, the CUP also legislated a major new family law that placed shari’ah courts 
under the authority of Ministry of Justice. The control over family law and personal status made 
the jurisdiction more secular. The new law also recognized the right of woman to initiate di-
vorce and it restricted the ground for the practice of polygamy. All these developments were 
cleaning Ottoman cultural legacy and finally the defeat of Ottoman Empire resulted in estab-
lishing a new country in Anatolia: Turkey (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009).   
There were several important wars and developments worldwide during WWI. Ottoman Empire 
did accords with some states and the CUP tried to establish a pan-Turkism ideology and a 
Turkish nation-state. There were some wars and fronts during these years that have a direct 
influence on the new republic and they are to be mentioned, however, it exceeds this study’s 
limits and only the ones, which are directly connected to the modernization, education, creation 
of the new republic’s new nation are explained in this chapter.  
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2.6 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk:  
Mustafa Kemal has a great importance and influence on the Republic of Turkey like Ben Gurion 
in Israel.  They both devoted their lives for their states and they are accepted as the founders of 
the states in both countries. There is a common belief in two countries that thanks to them they 
have their own independent states today. Another similarity between these men, they both came 
from mainstream families not loyal ones. Mustafa Kemal was born in Salonika in 1881 in a 
modest family. His father was a minor official and he was orphaned at the age of seven. He 
entered the military school (rüşdiye) in Salonika where was given a second name. He went on 
to the academy (idadi) in Manastir and in 1899 he entered War College (Harbiye) in Istanbul. 
Mustafa Kemal did not support the CUP much, at the beginning and he was not a leading figure 
in the CUP.  After the revolution of the CUP he even abandoned politics for a while.  In 1915, 
he came back to the stage with a great military success that saved the capital from invasion. 
This success also brought him a promotion and fame in the country. However, he had nothing 
to do in the capital as the Sultan and his supporters were rejecting the nationalist ideologies in 
any way. In 1918, he realized that he could not do much in the capital and decided to go to 
Anatolia in order to join the resistance movements, which had already started i.e. ‘Societies for 
the Defence of Rights’ (Müdafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti). In 1919, the Sultan who was unaware of 
Mustafa Kemal’s plans, gave him an appointment as the Inspector General of the Ninth Army, 
which was based on Samsun. Just after his arrival in Samsun he started preparing the organiza-
tion of a national army. In a secret meeting, he held in June, he got the support of important 
generals for his ideas. Mustafa Kemal wrote a telegram to a number of civil and military au-
thorities that says: The integrity of the country and the independence of the nation are in danger. 
The central government is unable to discharge its duties and as a result the nation is regarded 
as non-existent. The only things can save the independence of the nation are the will and reso-
lution of the nation (Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 1968).  
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Mustafa Kemal influenced people in Anatolia and it was now the beginning of a new uprising 
against both the Sultan and his followers and occupying forces. Mustafa Kemal was the most 
important figure who leaded the movements and organized groups for the independence. Strug-
gle did not last short but at the end the new republic was declared with the name of Turkey. 
During this period the country faced with political changes in immense importance. There were 
still supporters of the old regime –at least Islamic bodies like caliphate. “In 1922, General Refet 
Bele even tried to persuade Sultan Vahidettin to dismiss the ‘phantom government’ of Istanbul 
and recognize Ankara and join the nationalists but the Sultan refused” (Ahmad, Military and 
Politics in Turkey, 2010, p. 93).  
2.7 War of Independence - establishing the new regime: 
After several wars, struggles, and deaths Turkey declared her independence and it was time to 
shape the institutions of the new Turkish state. One of the very first and important administra-
tive changes was that the capital of the country was transferred to Ankara from Istanbul and 
this move was considered as a symbol of the Turkishness of the state. Next step was reaffirma-
tion of republicanism and popular sovereignty in 1924. All males, above the age of 18, were 
given the right to vote. Mustafa Kemal was elected as the first president of Turkey and he 
remained so until his death. Republican People’s Party (RPP) remained the single party until 
July 21, 1946. Mustafa Kemal had a great influence and control on RPP and consequently on 
the Assembly. The change and reform era had already started in 19th century with Tanzimat and 
it continued after the establishment of the republic more intensively. The doctrine, know as 
Kemalism, shaped the reforms and this doctrine had six major principles: reformism, republi-
canism, secularism, nationalism, populism, and etatism (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009).  
RPP’s reforms were not digestible for all people living in the country. There were strong refus-
als and rejections especially to the ones: secularism and nationalism from minorities and con-
servatives. However, having a great power and support of the majority and thanks to the prestige 
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of being a very successful commander at the War of Independence, Atatürk (after the ‘surname 
law’ he was given the surname ‘Ataturk’ that means father of Turks), could enacted almost all 
the reforms he had intended. Kemalist regime insisted on six principles during the single party 
period and four of them; etatism, populism, secularism and nationalism had a direct influence 
on Village Institutes. 
2.8 Creating and Introducing  Kemalist Ideology- Reforms: Turkish Nationalism – Cut-
ting the connections with the Ottoman Empire 
One of the very first aims of the RPP and the political elite at the time was to create the ideology 
of a nation-state. Turkishness was to be introduced to the society. However, there were still 
discussions on who the Turks were and what would be the features and concept of Turkishness. 
Actually, today in Turkey, there are still discussions on the concept of Turkishness. It was quite 
difficult to declare a nation state after the heterogeneous Ottoman Empire. The new state, at the 
very beginning of her foundation, rejected Ottoman cultural inheritance to a great extent. There 
were some realities that were difficult to reject, though.  
Of course, there is always the thread of continuity, which runs through the history of virtually 
every nation, and there is rarely a total break with the past. Yet it is vital not to lose sight of the 
turning points. This is particularly true in the case of modern Turkey where there has been a 
conscious effort to break with the past, especially on the part of the founders of the republic. 
Atatürk emphasized the fact that the regime they were creating had nothing in common with 
the former Ottoman state and it was a complete break with the past. (Ahmad, The Making of 
Modern Turkey, 1993, p. 3) 
Since the emergence of the idea of a Turkish national state, Turkish leaders have conceived of 
the schools as prime agencies in developing national consciousness, ideologies, values and be-
haviours different from what had existed before and aimed at the over-all transformation of the 
political ethic of the country (Kazamias, 1966). In order to rewrite a history and get over the 
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problem of minorities both ethnic and non-Muslims, Kemalists claimed that all ethnic groups 
living in Anatolia for centuries were actually Turks and by declaring this claim, concept of 
Turkishness, ‘us’, was expanded during the years from the establishment of the state until multi-
party system’s introduction. However, implementing this ideology to all people living in the 
country, especially to the non-Muslim minorities, was not possible because of structural rea-
sons. Consequently, while creating the concept of ‘us’ they also created the concept of ‘others’. 
As mentioned above, Gokalp’s conception of Turkishness influenced Turkish nationalism a lot 
but Kemalist conception of nationalism was differing from Gokalp’s as he supported the idea 
of Islam’s power of unification, which could not be accepted by secular Kemalist regime 
(Aktar, 2009).   
Especially after the 1930s, in order to get away from any theme that could remind Ottoman 
Empire, Republic fastened its efforts on linking ‘Turkish Identity’s’ historical roots to old Turk-
ish communities. In other words, the science of history was used as a tool, in order to provide 
legitimacy of the new modern-national state and two institutions: Turkish Language Associa-
tion and Turkish History Association were established (Yılmaz, 2011). All these efforts were 
to create and spread the official ideology to the community. During the single party period, 
Kemalist ideology influenced most of the people especially those living in the cities. However, 
there were obstacles in reaching and introducing the Kemalist ideology to the villages. There 
was still a growing reaction to polices, employed by RPP, from the conservative, Islamist, eth-
nic and religious minorities.   
 
2.8.1 Economic Reforms: 
Another big issue in the first years of the Republic was the economical conditions. The War of 
Independence was over but it left a huge economical crisis in the newborn state when it was 
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over. High officials of the government were mostly from military background who were edu-
cated and trained in the schools that were established in the Tanzimat Era. They were from 
middle or low class families and they were the ones governing the country after the independ-
ence. They had to do something for an economical improvement and because of etatism prin-
ciple of RPP and maybe because of their backgrounds, the precautions taken by these officials 
were mainly state based.  
According to Kemalist ideology, national sovereignty must rest on economic sovereignty and 
without economic effort national objectives would not be implemented. Thus, in order to 
achieve this, the state needed great changes like the mechanization of agriculture, the develop-
ment of industry, and the improvement of communication. Turkish nation had to work all to-
gether for this purpose (Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 1968). However, these goals 
needed time to be accomplished and the newborn Turkish state needed some urgent steps.  Sev-
eral attempts were made for a fast grown in the economy and industry but it still needed time 
and the state did not have time to endure at the time.  
It was aimed to build a nation state and there could be nothing more natural than nationalizing 
the state. Thus, during the first years of the Republic another phase was the Turkification of the 
capital and the labour market. It was aimed to nationalize the economy by choosing companies 
as the target that were established mainly by non-Muslim minorities and people –members of 
these minority groups- working in these companies. In 1926, the first official step came with 
enacting a law (Law on State Employees) and according to this law the first requirement to 
become a state employee one must be a Turk. It was a direct reference to Turkish ethnic identity 
because it could be enacted as the requirement is being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey. 
Another law that reserved certain professions for Turkish citizens and banned non-Muslim mi-
norities doing certain professions even in public followed it. Another policy, employed during 
the single party period could be counted as result of Turkification the capital was: Wealth Tax 
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(Aktar, 2009). During World War II, when the state was in other economic crisis, the state 
enacted another anti-minority law and forced the minorities to pay a huge tax for once, which 
resulted in tragedies when the liable people could not pay the asked amount. Of course it was 
not the single economical measure of the state but it was the one that showed, Kemalist concept 
of nationalism was not that inclusive. Village Institutes project was another attempt in order to 
make a reform against economic depression as it would help a fast improvement in modern 
farming techniques which would consequently lead to an economic development.  
2.8.2 Secularist Reforms:  
The problematic of Islam’s influence on the state was to be overcome by keeping it away from 
the government. This led to another important change, as during the Ottoman rule they were all 
together. However, in the Republic of Turkey there was no place for Islam in the governing 
bodies of the state.  While nationalizing the country, Atatürk, also made radical reforms in order 
to modernize the country. Secularism was essential to put the Western reforms into practice 
according to Kemalist view. That is why, after the National Assembly abolished the Caliphate 
on March 3, 1924 religious issues were under state’s control anymore. The new regime believed 
that corruption of the religious sense of the people in the country would reason to problems in 
the governing bodies of the state. The government should treat equally to all religions in the 
state and Islam and consequently Muslim population should not have privileges. However, dur-
ing the WWII with the introduction of the Wealth Tax it was seen that religion was still a de-
termining issue and even after the single party period a lot of anti-minority reactions developed 
among the Sunni-Muslim-Turkish population.   
With the declaration of the Republic a lot of important reforms were made. Secularism, at the 
end of the day, is a matter of fact that is open to discussion on how to enact. It has been an 
argument in the pockets of conservatives in Turkey and they have often used it as a tool to 
declare republicans as the enemies of the Islam. It was also used in 1950s while conservatives 
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were criticizing the Village Institutes and claiming these institutes were growing a nonbeliever 
communist youth. In the constitutional law of Turkey it is clearly stated that Turkey is a secular 
state but what conservatives often complained is the way it is implemented and it has been a 
significant argument for them to be used almost in any trouble.  
2.8.3 Educational Reforms 
The first reform was made in education was unification of it. There had been changes and de-
velopments since 19th century on educational area but the Republic made the most radical ones. 
After having a central control on education Kemalist regime decided to change the alphabet 
and instead of having the Arabic alphabet, Latin alphabet was introduced. This reform was 
made in one day and the next day almost all people were illiterate who did not know the Latin 
alphabet. This move was also against Ottoman inheritance and in order to strengthen the secu-
larist Republic all religious schools called as medreses and private religious schools were linked 
to Presidency of Religious Affairs and this institution was under the control of the Ministry of 
Education. It was a move of secularising and nationalizing the country. The official language 
was Turkish and it was to be taught under secular principles in the country in all schools. A 
new curriculum was prepared and official ideology was introduced to people first with Millet 
Mektepleri. Primary education was denounced to be mandatory for all citizens in the country 
no matter their genders, ethnic or religious backgrounds. In order to compete with Western 
countries education was accepted as one of the most important tools.  
2.9 Modernization of the Republic of Turkey during Single Party period: 
The modernising elites’ conception of poverty took shape as an outcome of the historical en-
counters of the Ottoman Empire with the Western world, and it was expressed mainly in cross-
cultural or cross-national terms to emphasise the social and economic backwardness of the new 
nation. (Ayata, 2010, p. 193) They accepted the poverty and backwardness of the nation as 
inherited from Ottoman Empire and the new political elite claimed that they were determined 
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to solve this problem. Kemalist ideology would follow the way on which Western states go.  
According to main conception, the newborn state should have taken the Western way in order 
to develop and go beyond them but it was crucial for the state to be protected against assimila-
tion while she was taking the West as a role model.  
According to main Kemalist ideology the only solution to go beyond these Western states was 
modernization and they needed to transform the society from poor and illiterate peasants who 
were strongly connected to agricultural and traditional economical features into a modern soci-
ety in a secular and industrial state. Modernization was mainly a move from ignorance to sci-
ence and rationality, backwardness to civilization, and poverty to opulence.  The government 
aimed to provide secular education, reduce gender inequalities in order to create a cultural 
change and modernize the society. However, RPP was underestimating the power of the reac-
tionary Islamic forces.  This new secular-modernist tradition has clearly favoured state-provi-
sion of social welfare and state-directed social policy above informal and traditional forms of 
welfare provision. The new political elite believed that welfare was in the hands of reactionary 
religious forces and in order to take it from them under state’s (consequently whole society’s) 
control, they undertook several social security measures and implemented social policies to 
make it real (Ayata, 2010, p. 194). Education was the key tool both to teach and to introduce 
the rights and duties of the citizens. The state saw her aim as establishing the wellbeing of the 
poor and to protect it in name of them. This could only be possible if the people supported the 
state’s policies and accomplished their duties as well. Thus, state had to reach her citizens and 
act together with them.  
2.10 Populism: 
Populism (Halkçılık) is one of the most significant principles of Kemalist ideology. It has a 
unique definition in Kemalist ideology. According to Kemalist ideology populism is the prin-
ciple that aims to transfer the political power to the society from the political elites. In practice, 
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however, they did not want to transfer the power to society. In 1950, it was the first time that 
society became a real participant and elections were made in a relatively free atmosphere. Pop-
ulism suited the new ruling classes because it legitimised their power by making them the trus-
tees of ‘the people’; at the same time populism neutralised the concept of class conflict and 
class struggle and served the purposes of the newly emerging bourgeoisie. (Ahmad, The 
Making of Modern Turkey, 1993, p. 63) RPP’s insistence on populism was mainly for legiti-
mizing and maintaining their governance. ‘Populism’ meant the notion, first emphasized during 
the First World War, of national solidarity and putting the interests of the whole nation before 
those of any group or class. In a negative sense it entailed a denial of class interests (according 
to Kemalism, Turkey did not have classes in the European sense) and a prohibition of political 
activity based on class (and thus of all socialist or communist activity) (Zrcher, 2004).  
However, there was a working class –maybe not in industrialized factories but in agriculture- 
and it was not possible to hide this reality with an official ideology and naming the working 
class just peasantry and claiming that they were the actual owners of the country in theory. 
When the new republic was established and declared her independence most of the people were 
living in the villages in Anatolia and the economy was mainly based on agriculture. However, 
it was not the Ottoman Empire anymore and people living in Anatolia experienced several rad-
ical reforms. On one hand, people living in the rural areas were trying to fit in the shape of new 
citizenship and it was quite difficult for them to adapt to this new ‘modern’ way of living. On 
the other hand, they were not very aware of the reforms. Most of the population was illiterate 
and even the educated ones could get news from the cities or the capital rarely as the commu-
nication web in the villages was much worse than the cities.  However, RPP had to reach the 
villages and inform them about the new regime and adopt them to the Republicanism.  
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In 1930s, two important developments leaded political elite and intellectuals to increase their 
interests on village and villagers. First one was the shock, which was caused by Liberal Repub-
lican Party (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası) experience. This experience showed RPP the fact that 
its political base was very weak and they had to gain these bases. Consequently, RPP started 
doing several attempts in order to reach people especially living in the rural areas. For example, 
People’s Houses (Halk Evleri) and Village Institutes were products of these attempts. The sec-
ond important development, which leaded RPP to make another move, was the decreasing in-
terests of intellectual people on revolutions. There were a lot of city dwellers who were fed up 
with the same jargon. All these changes in the society made RPP to change at the end 
(Karaömerlioğlu A. , 2014).  
McClelland asserts that certain institutional and ideological changes carried out in Turkey since 
the revolution has indeed undermined the strong domination of the Turkish father. Thus, he 
explains the strong domination were the abolition of the fez, "traditional symbol of male dig-
nity", the separation of church and state -consequently the replacement of Islamic law by civil 
law, which altered the legal status of marriage - and the granting of rights to women. Further-
more, the organization of the new army and the establishment of Village Institutes emancipated 
the boys from the control of their autocratic fathers. Under ideological changes, McClelland 
includes: a- patriotism, which meant a shift in loyalty from father to nation or the "generalized 
others" b- modification of the traditional theme of trickery "in the direction of positive achieve-
ment", which undermined the belief that people cannot be trusted and that "everybody is out to 
get you "c- modification of people's perceptions of government authority or of how society 
affects one's life, which resulted in perceiving authority in more positive rather than negative 
terms (Kazamias, 1966) 
When Kemalist ideology realized that they could not get a positive reaction to the reforms from 
several groups and people, they tried to reach these groups and people and tell them the reforms 
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directly. People’s Houses and Village Institutes were two important attempts made by the RPP. 
These two institutions were established to reach the villages and villagers but maybe because 
they established them on high hills and villagers could not get in touch directly with the new 
regime.  It was very clear that the society was not interested in the revolutions as they once did 
at the beginning. Thus, the first attempt to introduce and convince people living in the villages 
was People’s House practice. 
2.11 People’s Houses Experience:  
There were two very important projects of RPP in order to reach population in rural areas after 
1930s. These were People’s Houses and Village Institutes as mentioned above. In order to un-
derstand Village Institutes’ establishment it would be beneficial to have an idea on why the 
state first established People’s Houses. People’s Houses were established in 1932 by RPP for a 
development on cultural, sportive and educational fields. In 1930s almost 400 People’s Houses 
were founded and in 1940s the number of them exceeded 450.  In 1931 at the third congress of 
RPP there was uneasiness that people were not supporting the regime like once they had done 
and it was clearly observed with Liberal Republican Party experience that there was a search 
for a different option. In the congress, this fact was seen as a threat not just for the Party but for 
the state as well. Hence, RPP decided to unify all national powers under the RPP’s umbrella 
and create a more autocratic regime. Almost all administrators in People’s Houses were from 
RPP and it was a way of getting in touch with the villagers for RPP. Villagers used to come to 
People’s Houses and meet RPP administrators and intellectuals there. Later on, in order for 
reaching more directly People’s Rooms (Halk Odalari) were established in the villages. How-
ever, both the People’s Houses and People’s Rooms did not work as they had been planned. 
There was a gap between the villagers and the ‘intellectuals’-RPP members. People’s Houses 
organized trips to the villages in order to communicate with the villagers but the visits stayed 
at touristic levels, which disappointed the villagers even badly (Karaömerlioğlu A. , 2014).  
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2.12 Establishment of Village Institutes 
The significance of education in building the new nation was repeatedly stressed by Ataturk 
and by all other modern Turkish thinkers and political leaders. A cardinal tenet of the revolu-
tionary ideology and of the new Turkish leaders who would initiate and carry through changes 
in order to transform traditional patterns, beliefs and practices, and to establish a modern, dem-
ocratic, and a secular state. The educational system, particularly certain types of schools, was 
assigned the major task of training such "new Turks" (Kazamias, 1966). 
An educational commission was appointed by Atatürk to see what did introducing primary ed-
ucation in the villages had failed so miserably and to see how civilisation could be brought to 
rural Anatolia. The answer was obvious: educate and train youths from the villages, not in the 
cities, where they were likely to be corrupted, but in the local setting. It was to be taught them 
about the new Republic’s ideology and the revolution the new Turkey was undergoing, so that 
they could take the message back to the village. Moreover it was aimed also teaching a curric-
ulum, which had practical application so that they would be ‘doers’ as well as teachers. Such 
men and women would then return to their villages, bringing with them modern ways that they 
would pass on. Following the commission’s report, the government decided to set up Village 
Institutes and in 1940, Village Institutes law passed and graduate students would be the agents 
of change in the countryside. Despite the discipline of the mono-party regime and the absence 
of a formal opposition, a big number of deputies 148 to be precise did not join that showed their 
disapproval of this radical scheme by absenting themselves when the law of Village Institute 
was voted in the Grand National Assembly. (Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, 1993, p. 
83)  
It was also a clear sign of suppression. Deputies did not join the voting process rather saying 
‘no’ to the law. However, it clearly showed that there was a disturbance for the project. Village 
Institutes were established in 1940 but working on the project dates back three years ago. When 
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the need of reaching the people in the rural areas became clear for the governing party RPP, 
they started to think on how to reach those people. As mentioned above the first step was Peo-
ple’s Houses and then one of the most significant projects of the Republic implemented. In 
1935, 80 per cent of the population were living in the villages and number of the schools was 
inadequate in the villages. Teachers, that were sent to the villages from the cities, were not able 
survive in village conditions and used to turn back to the cities. Moreover, need of education 
for villagers was not limited to being literate as they needed to learn fighting against epidemics 
and means of production were still at primitive level and they needed to be educated on these 
fields, too. On one hand villagers did not meet the reforms of the Republic yet and they were 
not the expected Republican citizens at the time. On the other hand, it was very difficult to take 
state services to the villages between 1930s-1940s. Applications of taking the state service to 
the villages were either failed or did not respond villagers’ expectations and remained half. In 
order to succeed a new kind of intellectual, who could speak the same language with the villag-
ers, was needed. Ismail Hakki Tonguc who was also born into a village and grew up with the 
villagers realized this fact and later he became both the founder and theorist of the Village 
Institutes. Tonguc explains his view on the problematic of village and villagers as follows:  The 
issue of the village is not something only physical development and improvement of the village 
opposed to ones who think so, rather it s reviving of the village from inside both meaningfully 
and consciously. Villager should be revived to an extent that any power cannot corrupt her/him 
cruelly for her/his own purposes anymore. After that time no one can treat him or her as his or 
her servants. Villagers may not be unconscious and working animals, free of charge, and they 
should have their own rights just like every single citizen in the country.  The issue of village 
means that. It is to be considered with its educational problems.… It is a need to make the 
villagers conscious of the new regime: Republic. In 1938, Hasan Ali Yucel became the Minister 
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of National Education and worked with Ismail Hakki Tonguc who was General Manager of the 
Primary Education at the time (Aysal, 2005).  
Republic of Turkey followed statist principles from the establishment of the state until the end 
of 1930s according to some researchers and Village Institutes project, established in 1940, was 
planned as to be minimum load for state’s budget. On the building processes of the Village 
Institutes, students and villagers were to be employed and villagers would be asked for land if 
it was needed. Villagers had to work for –at least- 20 days in the building process and find the 
land for the buildings.  Difficulties caused by WWII had an effect on this policy but the more 
significant factor for implementing such a policy was state’s move from statist economy poli-
tics. According to main perception of supporters of Village Institutes, villagers and students 
were doing all work voluntarily but there are also some documents that show that they were not 
that ‘volunteer’ especially on giving lands. Even Fay Kirby, who has very optimistic views on 
Village Institute, questioned the fact why were the villagers working so hard for building of the 
schools while city dwellers were having them for free (Kirby, 2010). Another implication was 
that when the state passed to multi-party system, Democrat Party (DP) got high numbers of 
votes in the villages where Villages Institutes were built, showed villagers’ inappreciativeness 
of these policies (Karaömerlioğlu A. , 2014).  
It was a state policy to build the institutes in order to modernize, improve, and introduce the 
regime to the villagers. While implementing the project, the state used the villagers and the 
students in any field at the establishment process and students were the subjects after the build-
ing process as a means of production, too. It was a project for village and villagers implemented 
by the government and students and villagers were both the subjects and objects of the project.  
Village Institutes got strong criticisms from both leftist and rightist intellectuals. Rightist and 
conservatives did not want them to be established for structural reasons and they thought it 
could grow a youth that would support RPP. Leftist intellectuals, on the other hand, claimed 
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that because of the fact that all students come from villages the state would corrupt them and 
would use as free work force. Leftist claim was right to a great extent as the students in the 
institutes did almost all works and they had to work for 20 years with 20 liras salaries after their 
graduations.  
Despite the clear opposition in the National Assembly and critics at the establishment period 
and later on RPP was determined to open the Village Institutes and the party did it at the end 
officially.  
2.13 Education and life in Village Institutes 
The state was in need of citizens who could adapt to the reforms and revolutions at the time. 
However, the fact that majority of the population was living in the villages made it difficult to 
find these citizens. The first attempt was to give them classes on citizenship and teach how to 
be a Turkish citizen in the republic. 1930s were known as the process of consolidation of single 
party governance in Turkey and it was a period when pedagogues of the Republic dealt with 
producing well adjusted people with the regime. In this period, Afet Inan’s books: Citizen Ed-
ucation at School, and Civil Information for Citizen- I were quite significant. Afet Inan, when 
her background is taken into consideration was not chosen randomly. She was one of the ac-
ceptable citizen that Republic wanted to reach. Her works on Turkish history, also clearly shows 
that she could write one of the best books that Republic was in search of.  Later on, RPP’s 
general secretary, Recep Peker, wrote Civil Information for Citizen –II. In 1938, these two 
books were put in the curriculum of the high schools and teachers’ schools and because of lack 
in any other books on citizenship education; citizenship education was monopolized by the state 
(Ustel, 2011).  
Classes and activities in Village Institute during five years of education were mainly divided 
into two categories: culture classes and technical classes. A student had to attend 114 weeks of 
cultural classes in five years, like: Turkish, History, Geography, etc. and 116 weeks of technical 
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classes like: Farming, Husbandry, Fishing, etc. (Altunya, 2002). Students were aimed to grown 
in the Village Institutes in both ways. They were to be intellectuals and they also had to learn 
modern techniques that they would need in the villages after they graduate where they had to 
work for 20 years.  
In the first years of the republic, there was a perspective of general and abstract informing and 
it constituted the educational system’s core. The new regime was busy with corroborating itself 
and its main priority was establishing a general education system that would serve its ideolog-
ical hegemony constitution. However, by the mid 1930s, the need for a qualitative workforce 
especially in the rural areas became a significant problem. An educational system that central-
izes the concept of labour became prominent rather than general information and Village Insti-
tutes project was planned to serve that aim. Learning by practicing became more important than 
the general and abstract teaching. According to Ismail Hakki Tonguc, learning by doing was a 
method that suited villagers better than learning from books. However, Village Institutes were 
blamed of just concentrating on work rather than culture. Even some teachers in the Institutes 
criticized this method. However, the opposite idea was supporting the fact that under war 
(WWII) conditions producing wheat must be crucial not reading books. Tonguc and a lot of 
other educationalists and even a lot of Village Institutes’ managers thought that learning ab-
stract, intellectual, and general information was not a very important goal to be achieved at the 
time. It was an anti-intellectualist approach and it could be observed in a lot of parts of the 
world at the time. According to this approach, the reason of a number of problems were intel-
lectuals and they were someone foreign to their nation and not nationalist enough and doing 
nothing but just fabling (Karaömerlioğlu A. , 2014).  
Village Institutes were seen as a place of production thus, students and villagers were to work 
all together in order to help the state under war conditions. They could educate themselves later 
but now their main duty was to support their state. It was not too difficult to blame someone 
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not being nationalist enough who had an opposing idea. Even today in a multiparty regime, it 
is no big deal to blame someone as not being national (milli) enough when she/he has an op-
posing idea in Turkey.   
Hasan Ali Yucel set forth the goal of the Village Institutes that the project aimed to give a 
parallel education in which students learn the information by practicing. According to Yucel, 
the project was accepted as useful and even an example for the whole world by all experts who 
visited our country and saw the Institutes. To him, neither information is an ornament, nor is 
behaviour or attitude vanity. All of them are for life and Village Institutes were supplying these 
opportunities to ‘clean’ ‘Turkish’ children in order to make this principle real. Foreign experts 
saw this fact and they appreciated. However, some of our intellectuals and educationalists col-
lapsed Village Institutes rather than giving constructive advices, even without seeing for once 
or observing closely. Rote learning is not just our educational method but it is often our social 
behaviours, too (Yucel, 2011).  
In 1930s and 1940s Turkey was in a great economic crisis like a lot of other countries because 
of two great wars. Moreover, Turkey was in need of technology and industry as both did not 
develop at the time and the new republic was a lot back from industrialized ones. In an envi-
ronment like this, the state needed miracles in order to catch the train. Village Institutes can be 
seen as a miracle under these conditions. It was like a pioneering institution that could help the 
society move fast and catch the train. Besides, spreading the official ideology to the villages, 
these institutions had another significant mission. Students, teachers, and villagers had to work 
more than anyone else and they had to make miracles. As mentioned in the second chapter, 
Turkey needed Birkuts just like Israel. According to RPP these Birkutz were to be role models 
for the society and state could close the industrial backwardness gap by labour force and Village 
Institutes was the project that could produce these people and labour force.  It was introduced 
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as another war of independence but this time it would rather be for economical reasons. Stu-
dents in the institutes did their bests at the time. There are even some examples that teachers 
tried to convince them to stop working and to have rest. However, not all of them were that 
enthusiastic and there were some students and villagers who were disturbed of these mandatory-
working conditions. This was – maybe- resulted from the privileges of city dwellers. Because 
there was a fact that, if you were living in the cities you would not have to work for at least 20 
days for the state.  It was not 1920s anymore and people in the institutes and the villages started 
complaining –at least- whimpering.  
Almost all students were from poor villager families and they did not have good clothes when 
they arrived to Village Institutes. In the Institutes they were given uniforms and each wore the 
same uniform. They did not have a better life in villages and they knew how to cope with 
inadequate living standards. They had to stay in Village Institute –that were far from city centers 
and close to train stations- for five years in order to complete their education and training. Stu-
dents used to get up very early in the morning and do morning sports before breakfast. They 
had breakfast that had been prepared by their friends –they even cooked bread- after doing 
sports.  After breakfast they had free reading hours and each student had to read at least 25 
books in a year. There was a library in each Village Institute and that consisted of classical book 
translated mostly when Hasan Ali Yucel was the Minister of National Education. After the 
reading hours students started formal education. It can be divided into two sessions generally: 
in the first session, students learn general, cultural classes like Maths, History and in the second 
classes were mainly vocational in which they learnt modern farming techniques or basic health 
information. There was a gender-based education and it was not like Kibbut’s education system. 
Students were divided into two during vocational classes not according to their abilities but 
according to their genders. They used to come back to school in the evenings and had dinner 
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after finishing classes and works. There was not enough food for a good nutrition in the Insti-
tutes because of war conditions and economic crisis in the country but as mentioned above these 
students were coming from poor villager families and that was not a big issue for them. Every 
Saturday students, managers, teachers, and staff working in the Institutes came together in order 
to evaluate the past week and to make critics on the things that they thought that went wrong. 
In these meetings everyone could be criticized from managers and teacher to students and staff 
and everyone had to defend herself/himself in front of all members of the Institute. Another 
important development in Village Institutes was a circular –sent by Ismail Hakki Tonguc to all 
Institutes- that says there is no place of violence against students in these schools. In case of 
any violence act from teachers students have the right to respond in the same way. It was a 
circular that was sent to protect these students, who were far away from their families and living 
far away from the cities, in Village Institutes (Dündar, 2000).  
2.14 Collapse of the Village Institutes: 
Pedagogues of the Republic expected schools to produce national citizen (milli yurttaş). The 
most defining features of the national citizen were: loyalty and devotion. Consequently, official 
citizen profile based on a holistic understanding that was lack of difference among private and 
public sphere until 1950s. There was ethnic and cultural belonging sense on this citizenship’s 
roots. The citizen was not a ‘civil’ one but a ‘militant’. It was a communitarian citizenship 
because it stands on whole society’s wellbeing and a common lifestyle. Moreover, citizenship, 
which is nationalized, was to be in accordance with given institutions and rules and it was apo-
litical. The state provided a clean and neutral sphere to the citizens. It was a system that was 
lack of participation of citizens as the Republic was closed to political liberalism. Political par-
ticipation was reduced to citizens’ duties - to elect and to be elected- for the state (Ustel, 2011). 
The state wanted to produce citizens who devoted themselves for the wellbeing of the state and 
the society. Duties of the citizens were much more significant than the rights of citizens. It was 
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planned to spread this ideology via education. Village Institutes was the body to accomplish 
this task in the villages. It actually did well for eight years but when the graduate students and 
the villagers were done with the official ideology and started questioning it, first cracks became 
more visible which end in closing the Institutes a couple of years later. It was one of the most 
significant reasons that reduced the popularity of the Institutes and made it weaken. Surely, 
there were some other reasons and arguments for that collapse.  
According to supporters of the Village Institutes, the most important factor of closing the insti-
tutes was the factor of aghas (landlords). According to this idea, people who studied and trained 
in the Village Institutes, started to question the social and political system in rural areas and this 
situation disturbed the elite class: aghas in the villages. Consequently, aghas, who were strong 
shareholders of the governmental class showed strong reaction and sabotaged the most unique 
and progressive experience of Turkish educational history. In other words, the reason of the 
collapse of Village Institutes was aghas who had great influence on rightist and conservative 
politicians. However, when it is analysed the documents do not support this view. Village In-
stitutes could be a potential threat for aghas that could be kinetic later on but they were not 
threatening aghas and aghas did not accept them as a threat at the time. Besides, in some vil-
lages, aghas and students of the Institutes co-operated several times as they were brining mod-
ern farming techniques to the villages, which meant more profit for aghas. Another argument 
of this view was that by developing consciousness of villagers Institutes disturbed aghas as they 
could lose their huge territories. However, when Village Institutes are analysed it is clear that 
most of them were far away from the places where there were huge territorial belongings. Lower 
class villagers had small territories around the Village Institutes and they were not threatening 
these people. It is important to underline the fact that, the main purpose of the Village Institutes, 
at the time, was rather developing consciousness of the villagers against the nature itself not the 
sociological consciousness. Their main aim was to teach students how to cope with the nature 
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by using modern techniques. In brief, it was rather a war against nature: how to use it by modern 
ways, not developing a villager class who would fight for their rights and be aware of the soci-
ological conditions they had to face with (Karaömerlioğlu A. , 2014, pp. 99-101).  
Turkey did not have an industrializing project that would specifically ease the weight of the 
village on the country’s economic and social life. Eventually, the government lead of that issue 
but without a project. After 1950s, because of Democrat Party’s policies farming in the villages 
mechanized and it made a great number of villagers ‘useless’. Those villagers started to migrate 
to cities and it did not urbanize them but it ruralized the cities. States have two main standards: 
ideology and force. In order to link citizens to the state and the regime ideology –via i.e. edu-
cation- is used and when it is inadequate, institutions –that had the right to use force- come into 
play. Turkish nation-state was already established by armed forces so it did not have a problem 
with the use of force. However, there were important problems as the gap between official 
ideology and the mainstream ideology was very big (Belge, 2014). In order to close the gap 
Village Institutes were established at 21 points in the country. However, when the villagers felt 
that they were corrupted, things went wrong. Eventually, DP forced RPP to close the Institutes. 
They were closed officially when DP was in the power but closing process started earlier in 
RPP’s governance when Inonu changed Hasan Ali Yucel with Şemsettin Sirer for the Ministry 
of National Education. Sirer did close Village Institutes de facto by closing some significant 
bodies of the Institutes and by changing their structures.  
It was not –of course- that Village Institutes closed because of the pressure from DP. RPP also 
had its own reasons to close the Institutes, that is discussed above. Despite officially establish-
ing in 1940 and closing in 1954 Village Institutes’ preparations started in 1937 and by discharg-
ing Hasan Ali Yucel from Ministry of National Education and Ismail Hakki Tonguc from Gen-
eral Manager of Primary Education the project practically ended (Karaömerlioğlu M. A., 1998, 
p. 56).  
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2.15 Multi-Party System’s effect on Village Institutes 
In the minds of the new leaders, there was no room for reconcilitaion, no ground for any syn-
theses; the older order must be replaced lock, stock, and fez by a new one. “Education became 
a major instrument for what was to be Turkey's "grand transformation", hence, a major focus 
of reform” (Kazamias, 1966, p. 263). Trials and tribulations of war years, threat of foreign 
agents, and economic crisis in the country brought the need of a powerful government and these 
facts made people stand the authoritarian government during these years. After the war a change 
was experienced in the country that ended single party government and prompted the govern-
ment to a liberal, parliamentary democracy. The process began when Turkey joined United 
Nations in 1945. According to Inonu, the president of Turkey at the time, Turkey was not a 
dictatorship but a democracy and it was lack of an opposition party. In 1946, the voting system 
changed and this leaded to the establishment of Democrat Party officially. The next elections 
would be held in 1947 but RPP decided to fasten the process and elections held on July 21, 
1946. DP, a newborn party, did not have time for preparation but they did not have a bad result. 
DP had 61 chairs in the Parliament anymore. However, until next election there were discus-
sions and separations in DP. In February 1950, RPP and DP compromised on election law. 
According to this law each party had the right to access all opportunities for propaganda pro-
vided by the state. Three parties started their propagandas before the elections. RPP’s main 
promise was a reform on farming and more democracy. DP was criticizing RPP being too slow 
and its main promises were more civilian enterprises, right to strike for working class and claim-
ing more liberties for both economic and political areas. Millet Party (Millet Partisi) was work-
ing to soften the secularism and working for a society based on Islam. On May 14, 1950, elec-
tions were held in Turkey and DP won the elections with entering 408 deputies and RPP got 
only 69 and MP only 1 deputy in the elections. There were 9 independent deputies in the Par-
liament, too (Lewis, Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu, 2015).  
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After the day DP came to power RPP left the government, which lasted for 27 years. In these 
27 years, Kemalist ideology signed its name to several reforms in order to modernize the new-
born country. RPP’s six principles changed the society to a great extent. During the single party 
period the governing elite tried to spread all reforms to all people living in the country. In each 
reform there was an emphasis on democracy, which came to light only after 27 years. RPP tried 
to teach the reforms to the people via education and media and did not have a direct touch with 
them for most of the times. People’s Houses and Village Institutes were the projects in order to 
reach the communities living far from the cities and Ankara, failed too. Reasons of these failures 
as mentioned above, were because they were mainly because of being top down projects. There 
was always a struggle of making the people modernized, civilized ones. However, what made 
DP that successful in a relatively short period was maybe because it went directly to the people, 
accepted them as they were, and communicated in their languages rather than teaching them 
their own language. Another point that made DP so successful could be reasoned because of 
long standing single party period and some of its oppressive policies. DP’s success was the 
beginning of a counter-revolution that ended with a military coup.  During the period of being 
in power DP also closed Village Institutes officially, in 1954.  
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Conclusion 
This study mainly questions two state’s ways of growing citizens. In the introduction part the 
scope is defined and concept of citizenship is explained. In order to explain why these states 
(Israel and Turkey) and these institutions (Kibbutz and Village Institutes) were chosen, some 
historical developments at the establishment times of these institutions are explained briefly.  
In chapter I. the topic is Israel and kibbutz communities. Focus is mainly on the establishment, 
independence and development of Israel and kibbutz communities’ place at these processes. 
Kibbutz communities are a lot different than Village Institutes but in both states policy makers 
employed similar policies in order to grow proper citizens for their newborn states. In this chap-
ter, Israel’s policies on growing proper citizens are discussed via focusing on kibbutz commu-
nities.  
In the second chapter, the topic is Turkey and Village Institutes. In order to explain the estab-
lishment of Village Institutes Turkish modernization period is explained. It is important to re-
member reforms made by late Ottomans in order to understand the reforms made by the Re-
public. Village Institutes project was also a reform on both education and daily life as the RPP 
aimed at growing citizens by sending graduates of Village Institutes to the villages. Villages 
were very important for the RPP as it was difficult to reach and teach them the reforms and 
without teaching the reforms it was almost impossible to grow good, acceptable citizens.  This 
chapter deals with the policies that reasoned to establish, support and close the Village Insti-
tutes.  
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It is in great importance that beginning of the 20th century brought its state centered policies 
with it. Israel and Turkey also employed state centered policies in order to produce good-ac-
ceptable citizens. These citizens had to know their duties rather than their rights. They were 
supposed to support their states for military issues. As both countries’ governing parties often 
claimed that the states are under important “threats” and each citizen was to support the gov-
ernments on military issues as well as on economic issues. Kibbutz communities and Village 
Institutes were supported greatly by the governing elites, as they were the places where good-
acceptable citizens could grow.  These countries employed policies that would strengthen the 
power of the state and the governing bodies. The centralization process needed some moral 
values in order to convince the people to work for it. During this period different ideologies 
became popular among people in several countries. Unification of people was emphasized 
greatly and governing elites often claimed that it was the only way to come together in order to 
have a safe and developed country. Both Israel and Turkey are the states that were established 
in the 20th century and both lived a war of independence for their independent states. Before 
and after the establishment of those states people living in Ottoman Empire and Palestine de-
voted their lives for their states. On one hand, almost all people worked and fought for their 
independency and for a dream country. Israel’s claim was to establish a Jewish state and stop 
anti-Semitist attacks against Jews and Palestine was the land that was promised by God for 
Jews. These reasons were enough to be devoted for a great number of Jews living in Palestine 
at the time. However, some Jews, who came from socialist backgrounds, did not interested in 
religious affairs but they also wanted a Jewish state for their dream country and society. In 
Turkey, on the other hand, Europe’s ill man Ottoman Empire did collapse and people living in 
Anatolia fought for an independent state, which later became Republic of Turkey. The war of 
independence against imperial powers in Turkey lasted in the beginning of 1920s and the new-
born state declared her independence. People, who joined the war of independence in Turkey, 
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fought for a democratic Anatolian state. Some moral values like religion (mainly Islam), com-
mon cultural inheritance, and threat of foreign states brought the peoples together for an inde-
pendence war.  
When we talk about the things that linked peoples in these states to each other we need to talk 
about nationalism. It was very common to constitute a nation-state at the time – especially after 
the WWI- and Turkey was mainly as a result of this common view. Name of the country was 
decided to be Turkey and people living the in the country named as Turks. Instead of defining 
the people as Turkish citizens after the independence the emphasis on Turkish ethnic roots be-
came clear. This attempt was made in order to unify peoples under a common national base as 
it was a secular country anymore, and the new state’s elite class did not want an implication of 
religion not even to unify the people. However, it did not work as it had been planned because 
both religious and non-Turk origin people rejected the idea. In order to change these peoples’ 
minds and introduce the new state and reforms Turkey often used education and when it was 
inadequate military rooted political elite used their ‘legitimate’ force.  Main concern of this 
study is its non-force applications but force was not a rare way of suppressing the opposite 
ideas, too. When Israel is taken into consideration, her enemies, before and after the state’s 
independence not her own citizens but mostly her Arab neighbours.  Nationalist ideology 
played an important role in Israel and Jewish people did whatever they could in order to have 
their own state. A big number of Jews came from Eastern Europe and faced with discriminatory 
policies of these nation states there. Jewish people believed that they could live in any country 
and stay Jewish before anti-Semitism became that popular. They did not have a common inten-
tion of establishing a Jewish state in the empires or states they lived in. However, after anti-
Semitist ideology became common and hundreds of thousands of Jews were killed just because 
their religious identities, they believed the fact that they needed a Jewish state and it was the 
only way to protect them and their families. Israel –Yishuv before independence- did not have 
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to work hard to convince people living in the country on nationalist ideology as most of them 
already had that belief and they believed that all Jews were to unify and fight for the future of 
all Jews.  
It was not easy to establish a state and declare her independency for both Israel and Turkey but 
they accomplished. However, everything was not over as Israel still had her Arab neighbours 
and they were much angrier than they had been in the beginning of the 20th century and Turkey 
had to deal with non-Turks, non-Muslim minorities in this new nation-state. At that point both 
states needed an official ideology, which would define the state’s policies. While defining this 
ideology they needed a big support of people in the country. In Turkey, Kemalist regime made 
radical reforms and it was no like the Ottomans anymore. The country was still under the risk 
of an attack and for a good economy the founder political party RPP claimed that they needed 
the support of all community. People, supported- some of them willingly and some not, as they 
did not have another choice at the time- the Kemalist regime and the regime implemented the 
reforms and policies in the country for 27 years. RPP firstly constructed an official ideology 
and tried to convince people as all of ‘us’ had to act together in case of any attacks against ‘us’ 
from ‘others’. (The terms ‘us’ and ‘other’ are discussed below.) Turkey did not have a homog-
enous society and it was a very hard task for the government to establish a secular Turkish 
nation state. However, during the single party period, a remarkable change occurred in the so-
ciety. Official ideology was transmitted to the cities and city dwellers and they were able to 
adapt most of the reforms in a relatively short time. However, the official ideology was to be 
transferred into the villages as 80 per cent of the people were living in the villages at the time 
and it was planned to transmit it via institutions as mentioned above. In Israel, on the other 
hand, main official ideology was to create a Western democracy after they ensure the security 
of the country. However, this ensuring process took too long and even today there is the prob-
lem of security. Thanks to security reasons, official ideology and the power of the authority in 
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the countries both in Israel and Turkey have become steady. Both countries distributed the of-
ficial ideology thanks to security reasons as most of the political parties used the claim of being 
under the threat of other nations or terrorist organizations in order to strengthen their authorities.  
More than individualist or liberal policies holistic and security-based policies have been imple-
mented in both countries. Main arguments of the political elites have been against all treats the 
society must act altogether and they tried to construct the concepts of ‘us’ and ‘other’. In Turkey 
the concept of ‘us’ consisted of Turkish Sunni Muslim origins. It is not an official record but in 
practice it is observable in most field of daily life. In Israel on the other hand, defining elements 
of ‘us’ is mainly being Jewish. However, it is also observable that Jews from East European 
origin are more like to fit into this concept in practice and they constitute the group of people 
who enjoy the country’s welfare more than ‘others’. In order to define and develop these con-
cepts citizenship was in great importance. However, there are big problems on defining who 
were to be citizens and who were not. How could an egalitarian citizenship be constructed has 
been another challenge for these states. In Village Institutes and Kibbutz communities it was 
not that hard as members of these institutions were already devoted people and they had a strong 
belief that they had to fit into that citizenship. People who were not living in these institutions 
or who were not influenced them on the other hand, were to be convinced on the definition of 
others and us. It was significant not only to spread the official ideology but also to teach the 
citizens their duties rather than their rights. In her book Füsun Ustel clearly reveals the fact that 
Turkey spent great effort especially by using the education as the main tool in order to teach 
the duties of citizen during the single party period and even after single part period with some 
small changes (Ustel, 2011). Israel, on the other hand did not have to convince non-Jewish 
population in its territories as She did not aimed to accept them as ‘us’ but rather governments 
often tried to exclude that non-Jewish population. There is not a problem of ethnic clashes in 
Israel. The population mainly divided into two “Ashkenazi” and “ Sephardic”. Jewish people 
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who came from European origin are called as ‘Ashkenazi’ and Jews who came from Arab 
countries are called as ‘Sephardic’.  In the documentary of Rachel Leah Jones it can be clearly 
observed that second generation Ashkenazis do not even remember or care of their background 
(Jones, 2007). When they are asked about their nationality they only say we are Israeli. It is no 
matter they are from Germany, Poland, France, etc. In Turkey the situation is not a lot different. 
A lot of people –rare in East Anatolia- forgot their ethnic or cultural background and when they 
are asked they say we are Turkish. Some people even say my grandmother-grandfather were 
Laz, Circassian, Kurdish as if they were not their grandchildren. It is mainly resulted from 
constructed official ideology in both countries.   
Village Institutes and Kibbutz communities were both established for a rapid development both 
mentally and physically. They were seen as the pioneering locomotives of the whole society. 
Members of those institutions were motivated for a dream country and society. As a result of 
being isolated from the society they sometimes thought that it was possible to change whole 
society and live in a more democratic, egalitarian society. However, in both countries, these 
institutions were used as a tool by political elite and when they are done Village Institutes were 
closed and Kibbutz was left its own destiny.  
On one hand, today there are still a big number of Kibbutz communities in Israel but its form 
changed a lot and there are only signs of egalitarianism or socialist ideology. They resemble to 
capitalist firms as a CEO directs them and members got different salaries, families grow their 
children on their own, and it is difficult to feel the same enthusiasm anymore. Village Institutes 
project in Turkey, on the other hand, is still a matter of discussion. They were officially closed 
in 1954 but there is a common belief that if they were not closed Turkey would be in a com-
pletely different place. As Spiro claims that people’s dreams are not limited and when they find 
the proper environment they can do more than expected (Spiro, M.E. 1963). In these institutes 
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people did more than they had been expected and went over the limits that were drawn by the 
governing elites who established or helped to improve them.  
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